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[Introduction to the twin volumes: Christian Thomasius Cautelae circa Praecognita 
Jurisprudentiae Ecclesiasticae (Cautions regarding the Preparatory Studies for 
Ecclesiastical Jurisprudence), Halae 1712, 2nd edn. 1723; and in German, 
Höchstnöthige Cautelen welche ein Studiosus Juris, der sich zur Erlernung der 
Kirchen-Rechts-Gelahrheit auff eine kluge und geschickte Weise vorbereiten will, zu 
beobachten hat (Most Needful Precautions to be Observed by a Student of Law who 
wishes to Prepare himself for the Study of the Jurisprudence of Church Law in a 
Prudent and Skillful Manner), Halle 1713.] 
 
I 
Christian Thomasius’s Cautelen zur Kirchenrechts-Gelahrheit belongs to a form of 
early modern German Protestant humanist jurisprudence that was seeking to 
transform the historical disposition and juridical status of church law. It was 
envisaged that church law would change from law made by the church in the exercise 
of its religious authority — pre-eminently the canon law tradition — to law made 
about the church by the princely state in the exercise of a secular jurisdiction. It might 
seem reasonable then to characterise the Cautelen as belonging to a larger secular 
enlightenment, even if its author’s support of princely sovereignty requires this 
enlightenment to be qualified as ‘early’ or even ‘conservative’.1 As it turns out, 
surprisingly little could be deduced about the text’s form, content, or purposes from 
this broad characterisation, and locating the Cautelen in a secular enlightenment turns 
out to be misleading with regard to its cultural and political context. 
                                                
1  For an account that situates Thomasius’s conception of church law within a 
rationalist and individualist enlightenment, see Klaus Schlaich, Der rationale 
Territorialismus. Die Kirche unter dem staatsrechtlichen Absolutismus um die Wende 
vom 17. zum 18. Jahrhundert, in: Klaus Schlaich. Gesammelte Aufsätze: Kirche und 
Staat von der Reformation bis zum Grundgesetz, hg. v. Martin Heckel u. Werner 
Heun, Tübingen 1997, 204-66.  
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In seeking an initial sense of the Cautelen the first thing to be observed is that its 
genre is not that of a treatise presenting a general argument to the ‘republic of letters’. 
Rather, it takes the form of an outline of preparatory studies — the academic genre of 
the praecognita.2 This is addressed to law students in the form of a series of 
precautions that they should take in their preparatory studies for the jurisprudence of 
church law. Moreover the students are addressed not as all-purpose rational 
individuals but as a particular group whose intellectual horizons are set by the offices 
they will occupy and the historical circumstances under which they will do so. 
Thomasius thus addresses his students principally as the future juristic officials and 
advisers of Protestant territorial states, but also as Christians responsible for their own 
spiritual standing, while viewing the contents of these offices and the relation 
between them as unsettled and contested in the circumstances of post-Reformation 
Germany.3 
The genre and address of the Cautelen are in turn bound up with the substantive 
preparatory discipline that Thomasius takes to be crucial for the study of church law. 
Notwithstanding his objective of imbuing his students with a set of cautions suited to 
the new secular or political form of church law, the crucial praecognita on which he 
focuses is not a rationalist philosophy — not even a philosophy of law — but a 
particular discipline of history: namely, ecclesiastical history, accompanied by 
biblical criticism and patristics. If church law is to be understood, Thomasius tells his 
students, then it can only be through a history that situates the church as a purely 
human institution sitting alongside the republic, subject to a similar array of 
imperfections, and changing in accordance with similar historical contingencies. This 
conception of the church as a civil institution existing in profane historical time was 
directed against the longstanding view of it as a sacred institution that inherited 
Christ’s divine teaching and authority through its apostolic founding. The central 
                                                
2  Merio Scattola und Friedrich Vollhardt, 'Historia litteraria', Geschichte und 
Kritik. Das Project der Cautelen im literarischen Feld, in: Thomasius im literarischen 
Feld. Neue Beiträge sur Erforschung seines Werkes im historischen Kontext, hg. v. 
Manfred Beetz and Herbert Jaumann, Tübingen 2003, 159-86.  
3  Michael Germann, Aufgeklärte Rechtwissenschaft und religiöses 
Vorverständnis: Herrn Christian Thomasens Höchstnöthige Cautelen Welche ein 
Studiosus iuris, der sich zur Erlernung der Kirchen-Rechts-Gelahrtheit auff eine kluge 
und geschickte Weise vorbereiten will, zu beobachten hat, in: Christian Thomasius 
(1655-1728). Wegbereiter moderner Rechtskultur und Juristenausbildung, hg. v. 
Heiner Lück, Hildesheim 2006, 135-50.  
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form of this apostolic conception of the church was of course the Catholic doctrine of 
the passing of divine authority to the first popes via the apostle Peter, although 
Thomasius was no less concerned to refute the claims of Protestant churches to 
apostolic foundations and authority.4 
Here we encounter a central and difficult feature of the Cautelen and indeed of 
early modern ecclesiastical history more broadly: namely, the fact that it was shaped 
by a sophisticated humanist historical scholarship — aspiring to ‘impartiality’ and 
oriented to religious pluralism — while remaining deeply informed by rival 
confessional identities and adherence, in Thomasius’s case to a pietistic branch of 
Lutheranism.5 This co-presence of humanist historiography and religious commitment 
is in turn a pointer to why Thomasius’s desacralising ecclesiastical history cannot be 
aligned with a rational religiosity of the Socinian or Deistic kind, as part of a story of 
the emergence of an enlightenment secularism from a post-Protestant natural 
theology.6 Not only was Thomasius implacably opposed to all forms of natural or 
philosophical theology, but we shall see that in the Cautelen he explicitly warns his 
students against Socinianism for its depreciation of the supernatural dimension of 
                                                
4  I treat these two approaches to church history — the one viewing it in terms of 
the unfolding of an original truth through a continuous tradition, the other in terms of 
rivalrous institutional constructions driven by cultural contingencies and political 
interests — as emerging in historical opposition during the seventeenth century, and 
as mutually inimical down to the present day. For a different view, treating them as 
jointly required perspectives for the history of church law, see Martin Heckel, Zu 
Tradition und Fortschritt im Kirchenrecht, in: Martin Heckel, Gesammelte Schriften. 
Staat, Kirche, Recht, Geschichte, hg. v. Klaus Schlaich, Tübingen 1989, 613-35.  
5  For an overview, arguing that the use of history to defend confessional 
identities was not incompatible with the scholarly independence of humanist 
historiography, see Irena Backus, Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the 
Era of the Reformation (1378-1615), Leiden 2003. For a discussion of the 
(remarkable) degree to which ecclesiastical history continued to be written from 
competing confessional perspectives throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries — leading to its neglect by self-consciously secular historians — see B. W. 
Young, Religious History and the Eighteenth-Century Historian, in: The Historical 
Journal, 43 (2000), 849-68.  
6  For a discussion of the central role played by religious commitment in 
Thomasius’s thought, see Thomas Ahnert, Enthusiasm and Enlightenment: Faith and 
Philosophy in the Thought of Christian Thomasius, in: Modern Intellectual History, 2 
(2005), 153-77. For a different view, stressing the secular character of Thomasius’s 
ethical and political thought, see Frank Grunert, Antiklerikalismus und christlicher 
Anspruch im Werk von Christian Thomasius, in: Les Lumières et leur combat. La 
critique de la religion et des églises à l'époche des Lumières / Der Kampf der 
Aufklärung: Kirchenkritik und Religionskritik zur Aufklärungszeit, hg. v. Jean 
Mondot, Berlin 2004, 39-56. 
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faith. Thomasius indeed advises his students on the utility (and dangers) of such 
‘moderns’ as Spinoza, Hobbes, and Locke, but he cites them as ecclesiastical 
historians and biblical critics, never as enlightenment philosophers. 
In fact most of Thomasius’s central authorities in the Cautelen are ecclesiastical 
historians and biblical critics, stretching backwards to the ‘Magdeburg Centurians’ of 
the preceding century and forward to such near contemporaries as Le Clerc and 
Arnold, Simon and Basnage de Beauval. Recent scholarship has begun to show that 
this entire early modern tradition was characterised by the unstable intellectual 
relations that formed when confessional disputants had sought the support of 
humanist historiography, giving rise to cross-cutting historicisations of the church and 
theology.7 It was as a consumer and retailer of this proliferating secondary literature 
on ecclesiastical history that Thomasius sought to provide his students with a way of 
approaching the church as an historical institution that had come to exercise spiritual 
authority in the civil sphere, with the entire first half of the Cautelen being dedicated 
to this task. Only then, in Chapter 17, would Thomasius introduce the disciplines to 
which he was a major and celebrated contributor — political jurisprudence and public 
law — in order to summarise the case for the supremacy of the secular magistrate in 
ecclesial affairs. This allowed him to dedicate the remaining chapters of the work to 
the history of canon law, understood as the juridical armature through which the 
church had encroached on the magistrate’s sovereign exercise of civil authority. 
                                                
7  For some pathbreaking studies in this tensile combination of confessional 
commitment and historical scholarship, see Ralph Häfner, Jacob Thomasius und die 
Geschichte der Häresien, in: Christian Thomasius (1655-1728): Neue Forschungen 
im Kontext der Frühaufklärung, hg. v. Friedrich Vollhardt, Tübingen 1997, 141-64; 
ders., Das Erknenntnisproblem in der Philologie um 1700. Zum Verhältnis von 
Polymathie und Aporetik bei Jacob Friedrich Reimman, Christian Thomasius und 
Johann Albert Fabricius, in: Philologie und Erkenntnis: Beiträge zu Begriff und 
Problem frühneuzeitlicher 'Philologie', hg. v. Ralph Häfner, Tübingen 2001, 95-128; 
Martin Mulsow, Antiquarianism and Idolatry: The Historia of Religions in the 
Seventeenth Century, in: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe, hg. v. 
Gianna Pomata u. Nancy G. Siraisi, Cambridge MA 2005; ders., A German 
Spinozistic Reader of Cudworth, Bull, and Spencer: Johann Georg Wachter and his 
Theologia Martyrum (1712), in: History of Scholarship, hg. v. C. R. Ligota u. Jean-
Louis Quantin, Oxford 2006, 357-83; ders., hg., Spätrenaissance-Philosophie in 
Deutschland 1570-1650. Entwürfe zwischen Humanismus und Konfessionalisierung, 
okkulten Traditionen und Schulmetaphysik, Tübingen 2009. I am much indebted to an 
illuminating revisionist overview of recent scholarship by Dmitri Levitin, From 
Sacred History to the History of Religion: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity in 
European Historiography from Reformation to 'Enlightenment', in: The Historical 
Journal, 55 (2012), 1117-60.  
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I shall suggest then that is impossible to follow Thomasius’s intellectual itinerary 
in the Cautelen via a philosophical history that imagines a confluence of rational 
religion and political rationalism flowing into a secular enlightenment. What is 
required is to situate this work within a history of scholarship.8 Here ‘thought’ is 
understood in terms of the historical transmission and reception of particular forms of 
learning, in this case driven by powerful currents of religious and political conflict 
that scholarship sought to negotiate as it was swept along. 
II 
The text of the Cautelen grew out of Thomasius’s lectures as professor and sometime 
dean of the law faculty at the University of Halle in Brandenburg-Prussia. After being 
driven out of the neighbouring Lutheran confessional state of Saxony in 1690, 
Thomasius became a founding professor of the Halle university and a staunch 
supporter of the Calvinist Brandenburg princely court.9 This was not least because by 
this time the Hohenzollern princes had abandoned their planned Calvinisation of the 
electoral principality in the face of determined opposition from Brandenburg’s 
powerful Lutheran estates. As a result of this religious and political stalemate and, in 
keeping with the tolerationist provisions of the Treaty of Osnabrück (1648), 
Brandenburg had assumed the form of a multi-confessional state — recognising the 
Calvinist, Lutheran, and Catholic religions — ruled by an increasingly 
deconfessionalised Calvinist dynasty.10 This provided the context for Thomasius’s 
                                                
8  For a recent collection of papers, see Ligota u. Quantin, hg., History of 
Scholarship. 
9  On Thomasius’s enforced departure from Saxony, see Rolf Lieberwirth, 
Christian Thomasius' Leipziger Streitigkeiten, in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der 
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg (Gesellschafts- und 
sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe), 3 (1953), 155-59; and Frank Grunert, Zur 
aufgeklärten Kritik am theokratischen Absolutismus. Der Streit zwischen Hector 
Gottfried Masius und Christian Thomasius über Ursprung und Begründung der 
summa potestas, in: Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext 
der Frühaufklärung, hg. v. Friedrich Vollhardt, Tübingen 1997, 51-78.  
10  Hartmut Rudolph, Öffentliche Religion und Toleranz. Zur Parallelität 
preußischer Religionspolitik und josephinischer Reform im Lichte der Aufklärung, in: 
Im Zeichen der Toleranz. Aufsätze zur Toleranzgesetzgebung des 18. Jahrhunderts in 
den Reichen Joseph II., ihren Voraussetzungen und ihren Folgen, hg. v. Peter F. 
Barton, Vienna 1981, 221-49; Gerd Heinrich, Religionstoleranz in Brandenburg-
Preußen. Idee und Wirklichkeit, in: Preussen, Versuch einer Bilanz. Band 2, Beiträge 
zu einer politischen Kultur, hg. v. Manfred Schlenke, Reinbeck 1981, 61-88; Peter-
Michael Hahn, Calvinismus und Staatsbildung: Brandenburg-Preußen im 17. 
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combative lectures and disputations — in natural law, public law, church law, and 
ecclesiastical history — which were aimed at destroying the confessional state by 
excising the church from civil power, but which presupposed a deconfessionalised 
Protestant territorial state as their condition.11 
The dedicatory preface to the Cautelen provides a symptomatic snapshot of this 
context, for here Thomasius addresses his work to the powerful Calvinist nobleman 
Marquard Ludwig Freiherr von Printzen (1675-1725), a diplomat and high state 
official under both Friedrich I and Friedrich Wilhelm I.12 In Thomasius’s time von 
Printzen was the minister in charge of ecclesial and university affairs and was also the 
president of the Brandenburg Consistory — consistories being the mixed lay and 
clerical bodies set up to administer Protestant churches after the break with Rome. 
Thomasius clearly felt confident that von Printzen would share his dedicatory 
pronouncements: that while religion is integral to civil life and the peace of the 
republic — and the clergy are so far deserving of respect — the church must be 
regarded as an institution within the republic rather than the other way around, as 
Pufendorf expounded and as Protestant universities must now teach in their role as the 
seminaries of both church and republic (Pref., 1-4). 
The Cautelen zur Kirchenrechts-Gelahrheit had been prefigured in Thomasius’s 
program-statement of 1699 — the Summarischer Entwurf der Grundlehren, die einem 
Studioso Juris zu wissen und auf Universitäten zu lernen nötig sind (Brief Outline of 
the Basic Doctrines that a Student of Law needs to Know and Learn at University) — 
in which he had also envisaged the publication of Cautelen in the areas of natural law, 
public law, and general jurisprudence.13 In the event, the only projects to see the light 
of day were the Cautelen for church law and the one dedicated to preparatory studies 
for jurisprudence in general, the latter appearing as the Cautelae circa praecognitia 
jurisprudentiae in 1710, followed by its German version, the Cautelen zur Erlernung 
                                                                                                                                      
Jahrundert, in: Territorialstaat und Calvinismus, hg. v. Meinrad Schaab, Stuttgart 
1993, 239-69. For a valuable overview, see Bodo Nischan, Prince, People, and 
Confession: The Second Reformation in Brandenburg, Philadelphia 1994.  
11  Horst Dreitzel, Christliche Aufklärung durch fürstlichen Absolutismus. 
Thomasius und die Destruktion des frühneuzeitlichen Konfessionsstaates, in: 
Christian Thomasius (1655-1728). Neue Forschungen im Kontext der Frühaufklarung, 
hg. v. Friedrich Vollhardt, Tübingen 1997, 17-50.  
12  Albert Naudé, Printzen, Marquard Ludwig Freiherr von, in: Allgemeine 
Deutsche Biographie, Leipzig 1888, 596-600.  
13  Christian Thomasius, Summarischer Entwurf der Grundlehren, die einem 
Studioso Juris zu wissen und auf Universitäten zu lernen nötig sind, Halle 1699.  
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der Rechtsgelehrtheit in 1713. In the intervening years Thomasius had lectured on a 
variety of topics that would feature in the Cautelen zur Kirchenrechts-Gelahrheit, 
including Roman law, Brandenburg’s ecclesiastical ordinances, canon law, and, 
extensively, on Pufendorf’s works dealing with the relation of religion to civil life and 
the ‘papal monarchy’.14 It was not until he assumed the chair in church law in 1710, 
however, that Thomasius was able to bring these topics together and — perhaps 
somewhat unexpectedly — frame them with his extensive reading in the literature of 
ecclesiastical history and patristics.15 This allowed him to publish the Cautelae circa 
Praecognita Jurisprudentiae Ecclesiasticae in 1712, followed by the German version 
a year later.16 
Thomasius continued lecturing from the Cautelen zur Kirchenrechts-Gelahrheit 
in the years leading up to his death in 1724. We may conjecture that some of the fruits 
of this lecturing — and his restless mind — are to be found in the revised Latin 
edition of 1723 [and its German twin of 1728?]. One of the differences between the 
first Latin and German editions is that the footnotes of the German edition originally 
appeared as in-text scholia in the Latin, whose footnote space was left vacant. In the 
revised Latin edition of 1723 this space was filled with a wide variety of new notes. 
As we shall see, Thomasius occasionally used these notes to clarify or modify his 
earlier positions, frequently to add further citations, and sometimes to supply 
extensive summaries of key works of ecclesiastical history — including texts by 
Arnold, Le Clerc, and — turning this edition into a mini compendium of ecclesiastical 
history. 
III 
For those accustomed to treating him as a natural law philosopher it might seem 
surprising that the first two chapters of the Cautelen are devoted not to natural law or 
philosophy but to the discipline that Thomasius takes to be central to understanding 
                                                
14  Samuel Pufendorf, De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem, Lund 
1687. Ders., [Basilius Hyperta], Historisch- und Politische Beschreibung der 
Geistlichen Monarchie des Stuhls zu Rom, Hamburg 1679.  
15  Georg Steinberg, Christian Thomasius als Naturrechtslehrer, Köln 2005, 171-
72.  
16  Christian Thomasius, Cautelae circa Praecognita Jurisprudentiae 
Ecclesiasticae., Halae 1712, 2nd edn. 1723; ders., Höchstnöthige Cautelen Welche ein 
Studiosus iuris, der sich zur Erlernung der Kirchen-Rechts-Gelahrheit auff eine kluge 
und geschickte Weise vorbereiten will, zu beobachten hat, Halle 1713. 
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church law and ecclesiastical jurisprudence: history. This is in part because for 
Thomasius the change that lies at the centre of his concerns — from church law as 
sacral legislation by the church, to church law as political legislation about the church 
— is to be regarded as an historical transition tied to the Reformation and to the 
recovery of the prince’s rights in religious affairs within Protestant states (1, §§1-6). 
In a series of long notes, Thomasius lists a number of causes for the incompleteness 
of this transition, prominent among which are the miserable state of jurisprudence at 
the time of the Reformation; ongoing conflicts between legists and canonists; and the 
manner in which the good intentions of the Protestant theologians were undermined 
by their lack of knowledge of the disciplines of ethics, politics, and public law, as 
reflected in their attempts to maintain the clerical regulation of marriage as a 
sacrament. These problems were magnified by the clergy’s domination of the newly 
established consistories. Further, they were compounded by the mutual heretication of 
Lutherans and Calvinists; the retention of canon and Justinian law by such Lutheran 
jurists as Benedict Carpzov; the conflict among Calvinist and Arminian theologians in 
Holland regarding the ecclesial rights of the prince; and the defeat of the Arminian 
defenders of the prince’s political authority. This was despite the arguments of 
Grotius, Uytenbogard, Triglandi, and Voetius, that would be recapitulated in 
Pufendorf’s seminal De habitu religionis christianae ad vitam civilem [On the relation 
of the Christian religion to civil life] of 1687 (1, §§7-9, notes c, d, e). 
Properly understood, though, the discipline of ecclesiastical history is itself an 
agent in this transition, since it has permitted the church to be viewed as a temporal 
institution in competition with the state. Conversely, ignorance of ecclesiastical 
history, together with a lack of grounding in public law and politics, has been 
instrumental in the ‘papalist’ retention of canon law in Protestant states. For this 
reason ecclesiastical jurisprudence cannot be understood without a preparatory 
grounding in ecclesiastical history. Casting back to his earlier Cautelen for 
jurisprudence in general, Thomasius comments that history is one of the ‘eyes of 
wisdom’ [eine Auge der Weißheit], and that without ecclesiastical history and the 
history of canon law it is impossible for the student of ecclesiastical jurisprudence to 
understand the rights of the prince in religious affairs (1, §13). It is significant that 
here he makes no mention of the other eye of wisdom — philosophy — except via an 
oblique reference to the need for certain general rules and axioms of scholarship and, 
more pointedly, to philosophy’s role as a font of heresies. There are thus three 
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praecognita for the discipline of ecclesial jurisprudence: ‘First ecclesiastical history, 
second the doctrine of the prince’s right in religious affairs, third the history of the 
origin, progress, and authority of canon law’ (1, §15). [Die erste ist die Kirchen-
Historie / die andere die Lehre von dem Recht des Fürsten in Kirchen-Sachen / die 
dritte aber / die Historie von dem Ursprung / Fortgang und der Auctorität des iuris 
canonici]. 
Given its diverse forms, however, it is not immediately clear what kind of 
ecclesiastical history Thomasius has in view, or how this form of history relates to 
others. He attempts to deal with this uncertainty through a series of methodological 
reflections. At first it appears that ecclesiastical history is the most general form of 
history, since it deals with the creation of the world and the human race, the condition 
of innocence, the Fall, and the subsequent rise of true and false religion (2, §1). On 
this view the other forms of history are arrived at by abstraction from ecclesiastical 
history: natural history in so far as it is the history of the structure of visible bodies 
only; civil history which is the history of the origin and progress of republics and their 
human activities but without regard to divine worship and the church; and the history 
of philosophy in so far as it deals with the origin and progress of human wisdom and 
folly, disregarding divine revelation (2, §1, note a). In another regard, however, 
ecclesiastical history can be treated as a part of the history of philosophy and civil 
history. The history of philosophy can thus show how erroneous natural and political 
philosophies have allowed piety to act as a cover for the ecclesial destabilisation of 
the republic. 
This uncertainty as to whether civil and philosophical history should be regarded 
as abstractions from ecclesiastical history or, alternatively, as ways of framing it, 
must have continued to trouble Thomasius. For, in the revised Latin edition of 1723 
had added the following footnote to his earlier discussion: ‘In certain regards 
ecclesiastical history is a species of civil history, to the degree that it teaches the 
origin and progress of the conflict between state and church; in certain respects it is 
even a species of the history of philosophy, because heresy arose from philosophy’ (2, 
§1, note 1). [Historia Ecclesiastica certo respectu est species historiæ civilis, 
quatenus docet originem & progressum contentionis inter imperium & sacerdotium; 
certo respectu etiam est species historiæ Philosophicæ, quia hæreses ex Philosophia 
ortæ]. He then attempts to draw a line under these ramifying frameworks by 
distinguishing ecclesiastical history from sacred history, declaring that the latter is 
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concerned with the history of civil and ecclesial affairs only as recorded in holy 
scripture. 
Thomasius gets a little further in his attempt to circumscribe the kind of 
ecclesiastical history needed by his students when he differentiates it according to 
how it is used and to whom it is taught. The ecclesiastical history taught to theology 
students is oriented to sacred history and the pursuit of eternal salvation through the 
delineation of articles of faith (2, §9). For their part, law students study ecclesiastical 
history from the perspective of the civil role of religion in relation to worldly 
happiness and the welfare of the republic (2, §10). At the same time, however, law 
students must also be concerned with ecclesiastical history from a religious 
viewpoint. This is in part because they are also Christians who must take individual 
responsibility for their standing in relation to God. But it is also because as law 
students their travels necessitate greater intercourse with diverse kinds of believers, 
which means that they need to learn how to converse with the members of different 
faiths without either quarreling with them or being seduced by them. Ecclesiastical 
history holds the key to the necessary composure through the manner in which it both 
historicises and pluralises religions, albeit from a particular point of view. Thomasius 
then proceeds to sketch a typology of believers that his students are likely to 
encounter — Quakers, Socinians, Catholics — arranging them in terms of the 
misleading accounts they provide of the relations between reason and revelation, 
nature and grace, and the improper treatments of the civil duties of Christians arising 
(2, §§19-20).  
It should be clear then that despite his aim of forming a cadre of jurists 
committed to the supremacy of the prince in religious affairs, Thomasius does not 
address his students as abstract individuals in possession of universal principles of 
rationality — that is, as philosophers. Rather he addresses them as Protestant 
Christians who will occupy the office of jurist in a deconfessionalised Protestant 
territorial state. This means that they must learn to approach the church as a civil 
institution divorced from its sacred history and salvific role, without forgetting their 
individual responsibility for their own spiritual condition. Thomasius regards 
ecclesiastical history as the key preparatory discipline that will permit students of 
church law to shape this carefully composed stance or persona, but only if it is 
transmitted and received in a highly particular way. It is the role of the cautelen or 
cautions to delineate this approach, providing protocols for avoiding a whole raft of 
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appropriations of the Christian scriptures and tradition while endorsing a different 
array. In this regard Thomasius’s cautions for the study of ecclesiastical history may 
be compared with Francis Bacon’s itemisation of the various ‘idols’ afflicting natural 
philosophy, since in both cases the problem was how to refashion the intellectual 
disposition or persona of a particular group in relation to the offices they would 
occupy.17 
IV 
In framing his overview of the cautions required for ecclesiastical history in general, 
Thomasius provides his students with a fundamental historiographic protocol: 
namely, that all ecclesiastical histories —ancient and modern, Catholic and Protestant 
— have been written from particular confessional or sectarian perspectives (3, §§1-3). 
This is the basic reason that the ‘Liebhaber der Weisheit’ [‘lover of wisdom’] 
(studiosus sapientiae) must approach these histories with caution — in fact through 
the cautions that Thomasius will outline — because there is no path to an ‘impartial’ 
history of the church other than through the multitude of partisan histories which 
contain both truth and falsehood. 
A basic tendency of Thomasius’s approach starts to emerge in his opening piece 
of advice: that his students must read ecclesiastical histories of both the Old and New 
Testaments, as both covenants are appealed to in modern constructions of ecclesial 
institutions and laws (3, §4). In the case of the Old Testament, Thomasius advises his 
students that they must situate it in the context of the ‘Mosaic republic’ since its 
theocratic laws pertain only to the historical covenant that God made with a particular 
historical people, the Jews. These laws thus should not be treated as universally 
binding, which is one of the ‘political arcana’ of clerical domination (3, §5). Similarly 
in seeking the basic truths outlined in the Old Testament his students must be careful 
not to be sidetracked by the ‘fables of the Rabbis’, through which simple and literal 
revealed truths were overlaid by fantastic stories of the prophets serving the interest 
of different Jewish sects (3, §10). 
In keeping with Thomasius’s fundamentally Christian outlook, the truth quotient 
of the New Testament is much higher than the Old, although it too must be 
historicised. His students are thus advised to take care in separating the true from the 
                                                
17  See, Stephen Gaukroger, Francis Bacon and the Transformation of Early-
Modern Philosophy, Cambridge 2001, 118-31.  
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apocryphal books, for which Thomasius recommends the (Catholic) biblical critic 
Richard Simon, while also suggesting that they take regard of the ongoing 
controversy surrounding Simon’s work (3, §11). In considering the primitive 
Christian church in relation to its modern descendants, the former should be the 
standard by which the latter are judged, although all such judgments must be 
informed by knowledge of the historical circumstances underpinning both early and 
modern churches. Finally, in what starts to look like a critique of anachronism, 
Thomasius cautions his students that they must be particularly wary of accounts that 
attribute subtle speculative doctrines — often derived from pagan philosophy — to 
the early religions of both the old and new covenant, since these are almost certainly 
retrospective impositions serving later clerical interests (3, §9). In a similar vein they 
should be on guard against fables and false miracles as these serve clerical power (3, 
§§12-13). They should focus instead on the simple truths of faith that were accessible 
to ordinary believers, and on the practice of Christian life they commended, rather 
than on elaborate ecclesial liturgies and sacraments. 
Against this backdrop the ecclesiastical historians of the patristic period — 
Socrates (of Constantinople), Theodoretus, Eusebius, Sozomenus, and Evagrius of 
Pontus — can have only minimal benefit for Thomasius’s students and should be 
used only with the greatest of caution. This in part because they incorporated 
Rabbinical fables and Greek philosophy into their histories, helping to initiate the 
corruption of the Jewish and Christian scriptures as these texts were overlaid with 
later doctrines and the clerical interests they served (3, §18). It is also because as a 
result of their apologetic purposes, their accounts are historically unreliable and 
textually suspect, being compiled from a variety of sources without sufficient concern 
for authenticity, consistency, or chronological coherence. This is the manner in which 
Cassiodorus produced his history, as an uncritical assemblage of excerpts from 
Socrates, Eusebius, Evagrius and the others (3, §19). 
In commenting that the author of a fifth-century church history, Philostorgius, 
was an Arian, Thomasius observes that this coloured his account, leading him to 
contradict the other patristic historians, to attribute false miracles to the Arians, and to 
praise the Arian emperors while denouncing the Catholic ones (3, §22). Here 
Thomasius returns to his central theme: that all ecclesiastical histories contain the 
biases of particular theological or ecclesiological affiliations. The fact that some 
historians were orthodox and others heterodox — some apologists for the dominant 
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church, others for the dissenting — does not invalidate them, however, but is a 
reminder that all will be both biased and truthful in varying degrees (3, §26). This is 
in turn a pointer to a basic protocol for his students’ preparatory study of 
ecclesiastical history: that they must read histories from a variety of different 
confessional and theological sources, negotiating their biases and truths in accordance 
with the cautions being outlined (3, §27).18 
In shifting his focus to modern ecclesiastical history, Thomasius then proceeds to 
demonstrate how the lover of wisdom should use this method. In beginning his 
catalogue of useful ecclesiastical histories with the Magdeburg Centuries (1559-
1574), Thomasius brings into focus the duality central to the discipline: the 
combination of confessional parti pris with humanist historiography and source 
criticism (3, §29). On the one hand, the Centuries was the work of Lutheran historians 
intent on invalidating various Catholic sources, traditions, and institutions, while, on 
the other, it has been argued that it was one of the earliest source-based ecclesiastical 
histories, and the first to be structured around the historical development of 
theological doctrines and ecclesial ceremonies and governance.19 In acknowledging 
the Protestant character of the Centuries Thomasius notes that it was attacked by 
Catholic authors — most notably by Cardinal Baronius (1538-1607) in his Annales 
Ecclesiastici (1588-1607)  — but not in a way that could invalidate the source 
criticism that had been undertaken, as (the Calvinist érudit) Isaac Casaubon had 
shown (3, §31). Thomasius’s exclusion of Baronius’s Annales, however, should not 
be regarded as a matter of confessional prejudice in the narrow sense. Rather it 
formed part of an attempt to distinguish those ecclesiastical histories that served 
apologetic purposes without grounding themselves in biblical criticism and 
humanistic historiography from those (still apologetic ones) that did. It was not just 
Catholic writers like Baronius who fell into the former camp, so too did Protestants 
like the Anglican divine William Cave (1637-1713), another apologist for an 
                                                
18  This was a reprise of Thomasius’s earlier ‘eclectic’ method of dealing with the 
problem of ‘sectarian philosophy’, where he had advised his students to avoid 
adherence to any single philosophy, particularly those claiming privileged access to 
the divine mind or essence. Instead, they should range selectively across a diverse 
array of lower level philosophies and liberal arts, in keeping with the human mind’s 
incapacity for transcendent knowledge. See, Horst Dreitzel, Zur Entwicklung und 
Eigenart der "Eklektischen Philosophie", in: Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung, 18 
(1991), 281-343.  
19  Backus, Historical Method and Confessional Identity (wie Anm. 00), 358-64. 
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apostolic church whose lives of the apostles and saints Thomasius regarded as 
panegyrics rather than history. Needless to say, this was a shifting threshold. 
Conversely, in selecting useful ecclesiastical histories for his students, 
Thomasius goes out of his way to recommend works by Catholics and Calvinists in 
addition to Lutherans, all of whom, however, can be regarded as exponents of biblical 
philology and contextual historiography, even if they also used this for confessional 
purposes. Among the Catholics Thomasius has already recommended Simon’s 
biblical criticism and now he suggests ecclesiastical histories by Louis Du Pin (1657-
1719) and Natalis Alexander (1639-1724) — even if they are recommended chiefly 
by the fact that they have been condemned by their own church! (3, §§31-32). From 
the Calvinist tradition Thomasius gives a warmer welcome to Timmanus Gesselius’s 
four volume Historia Sacra & Ecclesiastica of 1659, not least because Gesselius 
(1612-1664) also exposes the errors of Baronius and shows the role that theological 
disputes have played in factionalising the church. Even Gesselius though infringes 
Thomasius’s cautions regarding the anachronistic imposition of subtle speculative 
doctrines on the early church, and has overlooked the errors of the philosophising 
fathers of the first three centuries (3, §§34-38). 
The most praiseworthy of all ecclesiastical historians to date, however, is 
Gottfried Arnold (1666-1714), a heterodox figure on Lutheranism’s pietist wing, and 
another critic of Cave’s defence of the apostolic character of the Anglican 
episcopacy.20 Thomasius regarded Arnold’s monumental Unparteyische Kirchen- und 
Ketzer-Historie (Impartial History of Heresy and the Church) of 1699 as a 
masterpiece of historical contextualisation and religious pluralism, and as coming 
closer to ‘impartiality’ than all other works in the field (3, §§41, 42, 59). Nonetheless, 
not even Arnold escapes the sectarian biases that Thomasius insists are endemic to all 
ecclesiastical histories. In Arnold’s case these arise from his predilection for a certain 
form of mystical theology, and from his tendency to identify true religion with 
heterodoxy and false religion with orthodoxy. 
The need to avoid both mystical- and scholastic-theological biases in 
ecclesiastical history leads Thomasius to summarise some of his key cautions. When 
                                                
20  On Cave’s ecclesiastical history in relation to Arnold’s and Thomasius’s, see 
Thomas Ahnert, Religion and the Origins of the German Enlightenment: Faith and 
the Reform of Learning in the Thought of Christian Thomasius, Rochester 2006, 63-
66. 
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interpreting the Old Testament the lover of wisdom must distinguish between the 
language of scripture and that which has been engrafted by later commentators, 
paying particular attention to the difference between historical matters and Rabbinical 
and patristic commentaries (3, §44). Interpretations should be literal rather than 
mystical and allegorical, with particular caution being exercised in relation to the 
Platonising church fathers in this regard (3, §45). In determining the literal meaning 
of scripture, students need to consider what agrees with the rules of textual criticism, 
the evidence of church antiquities, and the nature of things (3, §46). In an important 
addition to his cautions, Thomasius then comments that where none of this helps, then 
it is best to suspend judgment and await further research (3, §47). 
Thomasius’s protocols become even more detailed when discussing histories of 
the New Testament. When dealing with the New Testament the lover of wisdom must 
not only reject the apocryphal scriptures dealing with Christ and the Apostles, he 
must also distinguish the authentic from the suppositious in ecclesiastical writings 
dealing with matters not contained in scripture. Here Thomasius recommends that his 
students pay attention to the both the passions and the abilities of various writers in 
order to judge the plausibility of their narrations, observing that Cave’s unbridled 
veneration for the fathers discredits his history, while Le Clerc and Daillé adopt a 
more detached standpoint (3, §50 note d). He then reiterates his advice that his 
students should attend to conflicts between historians who represent different 
sectarian positions, so that they can ‘judge in accordance with critical rules free from 
the [question of the] truth of the narrated history’ [und alsdann / kan er nach denen 
critischen Regeln / frey von der Wahrheit der erzehlten Geschichte urtheilen], citing 
his own earlier comments on Philostorgius’s Arianism as an example of this 
procedure (3, §50). 
In developing this last point Thomasius comes close to arguing that ecclesiastical 
histories should not be read from the standpoint of their religious truth but with a 
view to the historiographic methods that they use and to the civil consequences 
following from them. Thomasius avers that he has shown elsewhere that after the 
death of the apostles, the church was divided into two kinds of believers: those who 
invested their faith in strictness of doctrine and gave birth to orthodoxy, and those 
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who turned instead to strictness of life and gave birth to ascetic enthusiasm (3, §51).21 
These tendencies converged in the idea that their supposed holiness gave devotees 
privileged access to the truth. This gave rise to monasticism but also to sectarianism 
and persecution, since those claiming a holy access to truth through a particular 
doctrine sought to suppress or eliminate others claiming the same thing on the basis 
of different doctrines (3, §52). From this in turn arose the phenomenon of dominant 
and repressed religions, both of which produced their own ecclesiastical histories, 
whose contents served their apologetic purposes, and whose outlooks varied 
depending on whether they were in power (3, §§53-55). Thomasius argues that we 
can see this in the case of Augustine’s conflict with the Donatists whereby Augustine 
favoured toleration when his religion was being repressed but then switched to 
persecution of the Donatists as heretics when his religion became dominant (3, §58, 
note m). 
For this reason, Thomasius argues, the ‘impartial judge’ [unpartheyischer 
Richter] of ecclesiastical history must not adhere to one particular confessional 
religion rather than another, as he must attend instead to the political position of the 
religion that is the source of the history (3, §58). When deciding between histories 
written from the viewpoints of dominating and repressed religions then, in order to 
distinguish the probable from the false, an ‘impartial reader’ [unpartheyischer Leser] 
may adopt a ‘legitimate prejudice’ [billiges Vorurtheil] in favour of those written 
from the repressed perspective (3, §53). This is because the dominant histories seek 
not just the repression of dissident histories, but of dissident religions themselves. It is 
misguided, though, to attack Arnold’s impartiality on the grounds that he rejects the 
apostolic histories of the dominant religions and accepts repressed ecclesiastical 
histories, as if this entailed adherence to a particular theological position. For Arnold 
is also sceptical of formerly repressed religions — such as Socinianism — as soon 
they gain the upper hand and seek to forcibly impose their theologies and histories (3, 
§59). Nonetheless, Arnold’s history still remains skewed by his own particular bias, 
towards mystical theology (3, §60). 
                                                
21  Thomasius had developed this account in an essay on the history of natural 
law that he prefaced to the first German translation of Grotius’s De jure belli ac pacis 
in 1707. See the English translation of this essay, Christian Thomasius, On the 
History of Natural Law Until Grotius, in: Christian Thomasius: Essays on Church, 
State, and Politics, hg. v. Ian Hunter, Thomas Ahnert and Frank Grunert, Indianapolis 
IND 2007, 1-48, esp. 16-22.  
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It should be clear from all of this that Thomasius does not understand 
impartiality in ecclesiastical history as if it were an absolute condition grounded in an 
objective view of reality — a ‘view from nowhere’ — given to a universal rational 
individual.22 Rather, he treats impartiality as a stance that is adopted when 
confronting the fact that all ecclesiastical histories are confessionally biased. This 
stance or intellectual disposition is something that must be cultivated through a 
multifaceted array of protocols: to choose from a variety of different histories; to 
achieve detachment by playing-off conflicting sectarian histories against each other; 
to restrain one’s own religious commitments and antipathies; to employ interpretive 
protocols that favour literal readings of the scriptures over mystical-allegorical ones; 
to situate the scriptures in relation to the historical customs of the Jewish and early 
Christian peoples; to use textual and source criticism to expose the Rabbinical fables 
and philosophical doctrines subsequently grafted onto simple scriptural truth, and so 
on. Acting in accordance with these protocols results less in adherence to a specific 
doctrine or ideology than in the formation of a complex attitude or comportment 
towards ecclesiastical histories. Such histories should themselves be viewed 
historically, as accounts that the churches have constructed to ground their theologies, 
liturgies and laws in the sacred dispensation of holy scripture, thereby to exercise 
political power over each other and the civil magistrate. Given that here impartiality 
is treated as the product of a complex intellectual performance that remains skewed 
by one’s own confessional, theological, or philosophical commitments — as in the 
case of the impartial Arnold’s residual commitment to mystical theology — then we 
can see why Thomasius regards it as something that can only ever be approximated, 
and why he recommends suspension of judgment and retirement from public 
argument when the performance gets too difficult (3, §61).23 
                                                
22  There is thus little in Thomasius’s approach to impartiality that would support 
Justin Champion’s claim that: ‘On the one hand the “impartial” historian suggested 
that his work was “true” because it was real, it was simply a representation of what 
actually happened. On the other hand the opponent was caricatured as constructing an 
historical past; such history was the fabrication of an interested imagination’. Justin 
Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken: The Church of England and its Enemies, 
1660-1730, Cambridge 1992, 26. As a cultivated disposition involving the fallibilistic 
mastery of ethical attitudes, hermeneutic protocols, and evidentiary assessments, 
impartiality had little in common with the modern epistemological ideology to which 
Champion gestures.  
23 Thomasius had already published a short essay on suspension of judgment as 
an exercise for dealing with intractably opposed philosophical-theological positions. 
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Historiographic method for Thomasius thus is not an ideology of objectivity 
serving to persuade his readers of a particular confessional religious truth, as has been 
alleged of early modern ecclesiastical history in general.24 Rather, it is something that 
is called into play in part through the suspension of doctrinal religious truth — as 
something lying beyond man’s damaged faculties — in order to investigate how 
various forms of religious truth have been historically promulgated. Of course this 
shift of perspective has a ‘partisan’ dimension too, since it is aimed at situating 
confessional truth-claims in profane historical time — as the products of particular 
ecclesiastical factions — and is thus opposed to the view that a particular confessional 
doctrine might be divinely true. The link between the ‘partisan’ and historiographic 
dimensions of Thomasius’s program, however, does not lie in the ‘ideological’ role of 
history as a scientific rhetoric for partisan religious truth. In fact this link is forged in 
another register altogether: namely, in the cultivation of a particular kind of 
intellectual stance or persona that regards confessional truths as objects for 
historicisation rather than adherence.  
V 
In several of these regards Thomasius’s approach to ecclesiastical history and biblical 
criticism differed radically from the ‘accommodationist’ form that had been advanced 
by Spinoza in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of 1670 — a text that Thomasius 
knew well and cites periodically in the Cautelen. In Spinoza’s view it was indeed 
possible to have a non-revealed knowledge of the divine being through philosophy, in 
fact through Spinoza’s own metaphysics. Here God was presented as an infinite 
intellectual substance whose thinking constitutes — or immanently emanates — the 
                                                                                                                                      
Here he argued that such oppositions typically arise from rival philosophical claims to 
knowledge of the divine essence. These claims have given rise to scepticism because 
of their irreconcilability, as we can see in the followers of Gassendi and Descartes. 
Suspension of judgment in matters lying beyond human knowledge is itself a practice 
of scepticism, but one that Thomasius recommends in order to remove religious 
questions from doctrinal philosophy and return them to the domain of inner faith and 
grace. Christian Thomasius, In übernatürlichen Dingen, die wir nicht genau und 
deutlich begreiffen, ist es besser und löblicher sein Judicium zu suspendiren, als aus 
Affecten eine von zweyen einander wiederprechenden Meinungen behaupten wollen 
[In supernatural things that we cannot clearly and exactly conceive, it is better and 
more praiseworthy to suspend judgment than from affect to seek to affirm one of two 
contradictory opinions], in: Historie der Weißheit und Thorheit, hg. v. Christian 
Thomasius, Halle 1693, 146-56.  
24  For this general argument, see Champion, Pillars of Priestcraft Shaken, 32-44. 
 19 
laws and forms of nature, including the mind of man. Man’s intellectual substance or 
nature thus permits him to participate in the divine substance’s thinking or emanation 
of all natures and — to the extent that he purges his mind of its corporeal attachments 
— to obtain a knowledge that is impartial in the sense of being objective and 
universal, since it based on union with the divine nature.25 On this view, although 
knowledge of God is possible through reason (or metaphysics) in the form of ‘clear 
and distinct ideas’ — which are the form in which the ectypal human mind 
participates in the thinking of its divine archetype — the biblical prophets could only 
accede to this knowledge obliquely, through imagination, owing to the limited degree 
to which they had purged their minds of corporeal passions and attachments. The 
prophets thus delivered this knowledge to the early Jews and Christians in the obscure 
form of allegories and stories ‘accommodated’ to the limited development of their 
rationality, which is why and how the Bible must be understood historically.26 In 
other words, Spinoza’s historicisation of the Bible is only intended to measure the gap 
between the limited forms in which truth has appeared to the human imagination in 
time — the biblical stories and prophetic fables — and the timeless truths of 
metaphysics, the latter being delivered to reason through a discipline that cannot itself 
be historicised, metaphysical philosophy. 
For Thomasius, however, drawing on his father’s history of philosophy, 
metaphysical philosophy is itself a wholly historical phenomenon. Metaphysics 
emerged from Greek teachings about the emanation of the world or nature from 
divine intellection, as opposed to its ex nihilo creation. Lacking access to this revealed 
truth, metaphysics exists in profane time as a usage or teaching immanent to the 
history of the Greek schools and way of life.27 Spinoza’s metaphysics is viewed only 
a pantheistic variant of such teachings, amounting to another sectarian philosophy 
purporting to know the divine essence.28 Thomasius’s Bible is thus not an allegorical 
text in which timeless metaphysical truths are historically shadowed forth in 
                                                
25  Benedict de Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise. 
trans. R. H. M. Elwes, New York 1883/1951, 14. Cf., Benedict de Spinoza, Short 
Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, in: The Collected Works of Spinoza, 
Volume I, hg. v. Edwin Curley, Princeton NJ 1985, 46-156, at 61-73, 80-81, 138-40.  
26  Spinoza, A Theologico-Political Treatise, (wie anm. 00), 14-42.  
27  See, Häfner, Jacob Thomasius und die Geschichte der Häresien, (wie anm. 
00); and Sicco Lehmann-Brauns, Weisheit in der Weltgeschichte: 
Philosophiegeschichte zwischen Barok und Aufklärung, Tübingen 2004, 35-44, 70-77. 
28  Ebd., 77-82.  
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prophecies accommodated to man’s infantile rationality. Rather it is an historical 
document through which certain simple truths of faith — that God created the world 
and man, and that man must love God and his neighbour as himself — were 
published literally to man, but were then subsequently overlaid with pagan 
metaphysical commentaries as a result of the bible’s historical receptions and 
transformations. For Thomasius, then, there is no sharp opposition between the truth 
of the bible and its historicity. Neither is there any continuous unfolding of 
(metaphysical) truth in time through the rational purification of the historical fables, 
since the truth was revealed literally from the beginning. At the same time, however, 
there can be no agreed account of the bible’s historical truth owing to the confessional 
conflict endemic to ecclesiastical history and the fallibility of human knowledge. That 
is why impartiality has to be cultivated, to the extent that it can be: not as an absolute 
condition based on unimpeachable philosophical rationality, but as a fallible 
intellectual comportment based on protocols of intellectual conduct that presume the 
impossibility of such a rationality. 
In fact the notion that the scriptures are both true and historical constitutes a kind 
of dynamic tension within Thomasius’s account, since even if the simple core truths 
of the bible are viewed as an historical deliverance, the form in which this occurs — 
as a revelation acceded to via faith not reason — means that these truths do not exist 
in profane historical time. This is not least because they are the means of ensuring 
that all other theological (and philosophical) doctrines and ecclesial institutions exist 
only in profane historical time, as human usages serving the temporal purposes of 
historical peoples and churches. Nonetheless, it is this tensile combination of revealed 
truth and radical historicisation that drives Thomasius’s discussion of ecclesiastical 
histories of the Old and New Testaments in the first half of the Cautelen. This 
combination permits him to adopt an ‘impartial’ historicising stance that persists in 
modern scholarship, while occasionally becoming unstable and triggering uncertainty 
regarding the limits of biblical historicisation itself. 
The central concern of the chapters dealing with the Old Testament — chapters 
4-8 — is not with the development of a church in historical time. Rather it is with the 
manner in which some ecclesiastical historians have appealed to the biblical history 
of the Jews in order to claim divine origins for an array of modern church laws, 
sacraments, and institutions: marriage, oath-taking, excommunication, witchcraft 
laws, and even the exercise of civil power by the church. Thomasius proceeds to 
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address this set of issues using the double strategy that we have outlined. On the one 
hand, he declares that some parts of the Old Testament story — centrally the divine 
creation of the world and Mosaic law-giving — must be accepted as literally true, but 
as matters of revelation and faith rather than speculation and reason. On the other 
hand, and at much greater length, he seeks to historicise all of the other religious 
ordinances and institutions of the Hebrews. He treats these either as restricted to the 
theocratic ‘Mosaic republic’ that resulted from God’s specific covenant with the 
Jewish people, or as laws and customs peculiar to the Jewish way of life.29 The 
historical character of the Old Testament laws and stories has been obscured through 
an overlay of Rabbinical fables and pagan philosophy, since these have permitted the 
historical stories to be interpreted allegorically, as shadowing forth supposedly 
universal theological or philosophical truths. In order to restore the historicity of the 
Old Testament, then, law students must guard against such interpretations by grasping 
their apologetic use by church historians as anachronistic justifications for what are in 
fact modern ecclesiastical doctrines and institutions. Spinoza’s accommodationist 
reading of the Old Testament as an allegory for metaphysical truths must be rejected 
for the same reason. 
The broad contours of Thomasius’s way of proceeding are clear enough in his 
discussion of the book of Genesis in Chapter 4, ‘Cautions regarding Ecclesiastical 
History from the Creation to the Flood’ [Von den Cautelen bey der Kirchen-Historie / 
von der Schöpfung an bis auff die Sündfluth]. He begins by providing his students 
with a cross-confessional reading list, recommending commentaries on Genesis by 
the Jesuit Benedict Pererius, the Calvinist Christian Schotanus, Johann Heidegger’s 
Historia Patriarchum — another Calvinist work — and, from the Remonstrant or 
Arminian branch, Jean Le Clerc’s new translation and philological commentary on 
the Pentateuch, which Thomasius notes had displeased many of ‘our’ Lutherans (4, 
§2). Thomasius’s central advice to his students is that they should read the Mosaic 
                                                
29  Noel Malcolm treats this ambivalence as a broad consequence of the 
application of textual-historical methods to the Bible, commenting that: ‘What this 
line of argument seemed to imply was that divine revelation, instead of being the 
condition or constitutive quality of the entire Bible, was something contained in just 
some of its parts: the words spoken by God or by angels, or the specifically prophetic 
utterances of the prophets. These might now be seen as isolated fragments of divinity, 
floating in a sea of human text’. Noel Malcolm, Hobbes, Ezra, and the Bible: The 
History of a Subversive Idea, in: Aspects of Hobbes, hg. v. Noel Malcolm, Oxford 
2002, 383-431, at 422. 
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history of creation in a brisk and literal manner, without dwelling on scholastic 
speculations or being sidetracked by Rabbinical fables. There is little point, for 
example, in engaging the interpretive disputes over the text dealing with the spirit 
moving on the water, as this has only produced endlessly conflicting accounts in 
terms of wind, inspirational breath, the holy spirit, and so on (4, §5). Citing his 
father’s historical account of the incompatibility between Christian and pagan 
accounts of creation, Thomasius declares that the central purpose of Moses’s account 
is to refute the pagan philosophical conception of the eternity of the world (4, §8), and 
to show that man himself is the source of sin, not God (4, §9). 
In terms of the fables and allegorical readings that have been overlaid on these 
revealed truths, Thomasius points to stories of the creation of angels and their 
intercourse with women begetting a race of giants (4, §6); Rabbinical interpretations 
of man being made in God’s image as indicative of God’s magical capacity to create 
similitudes of himself, then command the animals (4, §10); and pagan accounts of 
mankind’s autochthonous emergence from the earth (4, §12). To exemplify the 
manner in which allegorical interpretations have been used to provide a biblical 
justification for later church ceremonies, Thomasius cites Jewish and papalist 
attempts to provide a basis for the Sabbath in the story of God resting on the seventh 
day of creation (4, §11), and to ground the sacrament of marriage in the paradisal 
joining of Adam and Eve (4, §23). A more sinister instance is provided by those who 
cite the fable of intercourse between angels and women in order to justify modern 
witchcraft statutes, using it to claim biblical authority for the act of copulation 
between devils and witches that constituted the early modern definition of the crime 
(4, §20). 
The central tendency of Thomasius’s use of historical scholarship and biblical 
criticism pertaining to the Old Testament is thus clear enough. His aim is to deprive 
the Jewish religion and the Christian churches of a divine foundation for their positive 
laws by showing that the overwhelming majority of Old Testament ordinances pertain 
only to the historical customs of the Jewish people. There are some universal laws 
among the Ten Commandments, but they are exempt from historicisation only 
because they are actually grounded in natural law, understood as laws derived from 
the maintenance of human sociability. With regards to the laws given to Noah after 
the flood, for example, the laws prohibiting drinking the blood of animals and eating 
animals killed by strangulation must be understood as Jewish dietary laws — as they 
 23 
are by Selden, Spencer, and Heidegger. Students must guard against the attempt to 
treat the Noachite prohibition on consuming blood as a universal basis for the death 
penalty for murder, for the prohibition of murder is universal only because it comes 
from natural law (5, §§1-4). 
In order to understand Jewish laws, Thomasius argues, one must situate them in 
relation to the regulation of household, political, and religious orders of life during the 
time of the Patriarchs. Old Testament laws pertaining to marriage, divorce, polygamy, 
adultery (with married and unmarried women), prostitution, incest, and bestiality 
should thus be understood as ordinances for regulating the Patriarchal household, 
reflecting local customs and definitions, and making it anachronistic to view them as 
the basis of modern church law in these areas. The attempt to treat marriage as a 
divine institution on this basis is thus a papalist political arcanum (5, §13), while in 
the case of prostitution, the meaning of the word has changed so much since 
Patriarchal times that its not clear that modern statutes are actually talking about the 
same thing (5, §17). With regards to politics, Thomasius denies that the Patriarchs 
exercised criminal justice on a religious rather than a civil basis, citing as authority 
Heidegger’s exposure of the erroneous view that Jewish law was grounded in 
punishment of those who neglected circumcision (5, §§26-27). Finally, with regards 
to religious life, he argues that Patriarchal ecclesiastical government cannot be the 
legitimating source of such Christian institutions as the Sabbath or excommunication, 
as the laws of the Patriarchs pertained only to civil infractions. For its part, Jewish 
theology at this time was focused in a simple, unaffected, non-speculative faith 
oriented to living a good neighbourly life, with no interest in the legal enforcement of 
speculative doctrines (5, §§29-30). 
In Thomasius’s discussion of modern clerical uses of the Old Testament 
prohibition on marriage with infidels, we catch a glimpse of the concrete 
confessional-political conflicts in which these scholarly disputes were anchored. He 
discusses this issue twice, at 5, §20 and 7, §3, arguing that the Mosaic prohibition on 
marriage with infidels pertained only to the Jewish people under the old covenant, as 
it was intended to prevent their intermingling with pagan peoples who used alien 
sacrificial rituals. [Spencer?] Here Thomasius’s central concern was to stop modern 
theologians and jurists from citing the prohibition as the biblical basis for banning 
marriage between the members of different Christian confessions. 
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The religious and political stakes in his historicisation of this biblical prohibition 
start to emerge if we take note of the text that Thomasius cites as authority for his 
second discussion of the issue: namely, his own treatise, Fürstliche Personen Heyrath 
(The Marriage of Royal Persons) of 1689 (7, §3, note d).30 Published while he was 
still at the (Saxon Lutheran) University of Leipzig, Thomasius’s treatise was a 
defence of the legitimacy of the marriage between Princess Maria Amalia, Calvinist 
daughter of Elector Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg, and the Lutheran duke, 
Moritz Wilhelm of Saxon-Zeitz; an alliance that was implicated in Brandenburg’s 
plans to annex the duchy of Magdeburg. Thomasius was responding to an anonymous 
pamphlet that had been written by the Lutheran provost of the Magdeburg cathedral, 
Philipp Müller, in which Müller had indeed sought to demonstrate the illegitimacy of 
such marriages by citing, amongst others, the Mosaic text prohibiting marriage 
between Jews and infidels. In a packed polemic, Müller had embedded the Mosaic 
prohibition in a wide phalanx of other theological and juridical texts — everything 
from Justinian and canon law to Benedict Carpzov’s treatment of marriage as a 
sacrament in his influential Lutheran ecclesiastical jurisprudence. All of these showed 
that marriage was of divine will and insitution — not a matter of natural or civil law 
— and that inter-confessional marriage was indeed tantamount to marriage with an 
infidel, perhaps even with a Jew, Turk, or heretic.31 
In the course of his response Thomasius brought the recent historicisation of the 
Old Testament to bear in the context of confessional political dispute, arguing that it 
was unacceptable for Müller to cite the Mosaic prohibition on inter-marriage as this 
pertained only to Jewish ceremonial law and ‘Policey’, having no validity beyond the 
historical Jewish republic. At the same time, in a clear demonstration of what was at 
stake in the transition from ecclesial to secular or civil church law 
(Staatskirchenrecht), Thomasius also insisted that the Lutheran church law on which 
Müller relied had been superseded by imperial public law, in the form of the Treaty of 
                                                
30  Christian Thomasius, Rechtmäßige Erörterung der Ehe- und Gewissens-Frage, 
Ob zwey Fürstliche Personen im Römischen Reich, deren eine der Lutherischen, die 
andere der Reformirten Relgion zugethan ist, einander mit guten Gewissen heyrathen 
können?, in: Auserlesene deutsche Schriften, Zweiter Teil, Frankfurt und Leipzig 
1714 (repr. Hildesheim 1994), 1-102.  
31  [Philipp Müller], Der Fang des Edlen Lebens durch Frembde Glaubens-Ehe, 
Leipzig 1689, in: Christian Thomasius, Auserlesene deutsche Schriften, Zweiter Teil, 
Frankfurt und Leipzig 1714 (repr. Hildesheim 1994), 103-92. 
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Osnabrück of 1648.32 This had established equal civil rights for Calvinists alongside 
Lutherans, effectively making the proposed marriage permissible by public law, and 
turning any attempt to oppose it on ecclesiastical-legal grounds into a possible breach 
of that law. In helping to provoke his expulsion from (a still highly confessionalised) 
Lutheran Saxony in 1690, Thomasius’s treatise displays the concrete confessional-
political stakes in these otherwise arcane disputes in biblical criticism and 
ecclesiastical history; but so too does Müller’s polemic, for it earned him a spell in 
Brandenburg’s Spandau prison, on charges that he had indeed infringed the Religious 
Peace of Osnabrück. 
Driven along by such powerful forces, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Thomasius’s dual strategy — of maintaining the revealed truth of certain ‘core’ 
biblical passages alongside (and as a condition of) the extensive historicisation of 
others — should become periodically unstable. In discussing the Mosaic period, for 
example, Thomasius warns his students against miracle stories of the kind found in 
the midrashic life of Moses published by the Jewish scholar Gilbert Gaulmyn in 1629. 
Here various Rabbinical fables have been incorporated into the account, such as those 
detailing Moses and Aaron’s use of their magic staff against the Pharaoh’s magicians. 
The long note that Thomasius attaches to this warning, however, shows that it is not 
always clear just how to act on it (6, §3, note cc). On the one hand, citing chapter 6 of 
Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, he warns his students to be on guard 
against ‘atheist’ interpretations of the miracles as works of natural or mathematical 
magic, or as bluffs, since that contradicts scripture. On the other hand, they must also 
guard against the common opinion that the Pharaoh’s magicians were diabolical 
sorcerers who received their powers through a pact with the devil. This is against both 
reason and the history of philosophy, says Thomasius, because the Egyptian magi 
were in fact a kind of philosopher, and Moses himself had learned their philosophy. 
At the same time, just when it looks as if Thomasius is about to historicise the magi, 
he declares that it possible that the magi did in fact perform miracles, but as 
instruments of God rather than the devil. In other words, Thomasius leaves the matter 
unresolved as he is unsure whether to read the magi text literally, as instantiating a 
revealed truth about God’s supra-natural agency, or historically, in terms of the 
existence of a particular sect of philosophers. In the end, what matters to him is that 
                                                
32  Thomasius, (wie anm. 00), 81. 
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Mosaic miracles not be augmented with new fables serving clerical interests, since 
Moses’ laws can be understood — in terms of the nature of Jewish ceremonies, the 
Mosaic republic, or natural law — without such inventions (6, §§4-10). 
Something similar happens with regard to the hotly contested issue of biblical 
authorship, which Thomasius tends to leave suspended between inspiration and 
historicisation. On the dispute over who wrote the Pentateuch, Thomasius simply 
warns his students against Spinoza’s denial of Moses’ authorship, citing rival 
positions by Simon and Le Clerc without bothering to explain them (6, §21, note x). 
On the related question of whether Moses simply compiled preceding sacred histories 
or composed his history under divine inspiration, Thomasius does little more than 
ascribe the latter viewpoint to ‘our theologians’ and the former to Le Clerc, whom 
still should be read warily (6, §21, note y). And on the nature of divine inspiration 
itself he tells his students to study the controversy between Le Clerc and Simon, but 
without finding it necessary to clarify the stakes of the disagreement for them (6, §23, 
note a). In fact in responding to the biblical inconsistencies that Le Clerc’s historical 
commentaries had revealed, Simon had sought to turn them to Catholicism’s 
advantage, arguing that the consistency of scripture depended on it being embedded 
in the authoritative tradition of the (Catholic) church, acting under the continuous 
inspiration of the Holy Spirit.33 
Similarly, with regards to the prophets, Thomasius warns his students against 
Spinoza’s view of them as melancholics dominated by their imaginations (7, §21), 
while declaring that Simon’s treatment of them as public scribes compiling existing 
histories had been sufficiently refuted by Le Clerc, again without clarifying the 
confessional stakes in this disagreement (7, §22). Finally, Thomasius allows the 
threshold between the truth and historicity of the prophets to float. He thus tells his 
students that the bible indeed records that the prophet Elias (Elijah) confirmed his 
prophecies with miracles, as when he was fed by ravens during a prophesied drought. 
Recently, however, (the Helmstedt orientalist) Hermann van der Hardt (1660-1746) 
had discovered that the Hebrew word for ‘ravens’ — orbîm — was phonologically 
similar to words referring to the citizens of the town of ‘Orbo’ or ‘Aorab’, suggesting 
a non-miraculous source for the prophet’s sustenance (7, §25). Such indeterminacy is 
a pointer to an important but perhaps unintended consequence of this way of 
                                                
33  Adam Sutcliffe, Judaism and Enlightenment, Cambridge 2003, 34-37. 
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historicising the Bible: once the privileging of certain revealed biblical truths had 
made it possible to subject large swathes of the bible to a profane historicisation then 
— absent the sharp divide between truth and historicity provided by 
accommodationist philosophical history — there was little to stop such historicisation 
washing back over the revealed truths themselves.34 
VI 
The introduction to the ecclesiastical history of the New Testament in chapter 9 of the 
Cautelen is marked by a shift in both content and form. In keeping with Thomasius’s 
fundamentally Christian outlook, the advent of Christ signifies the end of sacred 
history — as the biblical history of God’s dealings with a particular people — and 
initiates the history of the church as an institution within profane time. This transition 
is marked by a change in Thomasius’s own periodisation of church history, from the 
biblical chronology of the first eight chapters — from creation to the flood, the flood 
to Moses, from Moses to the Babylonian captivity, and so on — to a periodisation 
based on one-hundred year intervals, which had been first used in the Magdeburg 
Centuries. 
At the same time, in reminding his students that church histories differ according 
to the allegiances of their writers, Thomasius continues to employ his fundamental 
scholarly strategy, with its double-sided combination of humanistic historiography 
and religious engagement. There are thus two criteria of truth that his students can use 
in sifting the competing histories. On the one hand, they must continue to compare 
different accounts against each other using the protocols — of textual coherence, 
authenticity, source consistency — as outlined above (9, §2, note a). On the other 
hand, they can now make full use of criteria derived from the original purpose of 
Christianity, which could not be deployed in Old Testament ecclesiastical history as 
they only emerged with the historical advent of Christianity itself (9, §3). The original 
and constitutive purpose of the Christian religion is to teach salvation through Christ 
                                                
34  Daniel Stolzenberg has argued that John Spencer’s historicisation of Jewish 
religious rituals — which he argued were borrowed from Eyptian ceremonies in order 
to accommodate divine truth to the primitive understandings of the early Jews — was 
subject to a similar logic of unintended historical consequences. Spencer had intended 
his history to make Anglican rituals acceptable to puritans as adiaphora, while 
preserving core revealed truths, yet more radical historicisers soon used this to 
historicise the revealed truths themselves. See, Daniel Stolzenberg, John Spencer and 
the Perils of Sacred Philology, in: Past and Present, 214 (2012), 129-63.  
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in accordance with the simple and basic teachings found in the church in its early or 
pristine condition. The Jewish religion too had begun as a simple and pure faith under 
the Patriarchs but — in a manner that anticipates the future corruption of the Christian 
church — was transformed by the rise of two sects: the Pharisees who taught the 
pagan doctrine of metempsychosis or the transmigration of souls, and the Sadducees 
who denied resurrection and the spiritual world (9, §5). Christ’s arrival must be 
understood in terms of the overcoming of these errors and the renewal of a simple 
saving faith, allowing Thomasius to treat Christ as an ecclesial reformer rather than as 
the incarnation of God, citing Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity in support (9, 
§6, note d). 
In order to understand Christ and the original purpose of the Christian religion, 
however, Thomasius tells his students that the must guard against two reciprocal 
errors. First, they must be wary of the view that Christian doctrine consists only in 
ethical teaching grounded in reason, with no supernatural truths. Thomasius suggests 
that while this view can be ascribed to Socinians and Unitarians, it has been unfairly 
attached to Hobbes’s theological minimalism; although Hobbes has been superseded 
by the clearer account of a minimally doctrinal salvific Christianity provided in 
Locke’s work (9, §7, note e). Second, his students must be on guard against a much 
more significant error: namely, the view that Christ or the apostles introduced a 
speculative religion based on philosophical insight into the secrets of the divine 
essence. On this view Christ was the source of a religion capable of being formulated 
as a confession — symbolic creed, or articles of faith — and thence imposed on 
believers as a condition of salvation, and even enforced through human punishments 
(9, §§8-9). In fact it is this second error that provides the focal point for Thomasius’s 
historical scholarship and religious commitment, as it contains the template for his 
history of the Christian church: namely, as an account of the changes that led from its 
original simple and pure form, to the philosophically subtle and repressive churches 
of today (9, §10). 
In a significant departure from the Protestant historiography launched by the 
Magdeburg Centuries, Thomasius denies that this corruption began with the advent of 
the papacy in the sixth century, insisting that it started in the first century and was the 
result of the historical context in which the church developed. Citing Grotius, 
Gesselius, Arnold, Colberg, and Souverain as his authorities, Thomasius now 
sketches the two pillars of his contextual history. Firstly, the transformation of 
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Christianity into a speculative religion mediated by a philosophical clergy was a 
result of the fact that Christianity emerged from Rabbinical Judaism and was initially 
elaborated in pagan (Greek and Roman) cultural contexts. It was thus through 
competition for converts that such Jewish ceremonies as circumcision were 
incorporated into Christianity (9, §17). Meanwhile, pagan philosophy — pre-
eminently from the Platonic, Stoic and gnostic traditions — entered Christianity 
because its first post-apostolic teachers had in fact been pagan philosophers and were 
engaged in continuous disputes with other pagan philosophers, thereby giving rise to 
the first heresies (9, §18). It was in this way that the simple truths of early Christianity 
were corrupted through the admixture of speculative philosophy and theosophical 
fables, producing the first doctrinal creeds or articles of faith. New religious concepts 
and biblical interpretations arose from the importation of Platonic philosophy, and 
those who did not adopt them were persecuted for impiety (9, §21).35 
Second if ‘papalism’ — understood as the exercise of clerical power on the basis 
of religion — was an effect rather than the cause of these developments, then that is 
because once a philosophical religion had been established it brought with it the claim 
that those possessing the required theosophical knowledge had access to a special 
holiness. This elevated the clergy above the laity, and permitted them to claim the 
role of privileged mediators of the divine word and saving faith (9, §§30-38). Since 
this special knowledge derived only from philosophy, however, and since there were 
several contending philosophies, rival church factions formed around them, engaging 
                                                
35  The long trajectory of this historical account of the Hellenisation and 
‘philosophisation’ of Christianity is shown by the fact that scholars are still seeking to 
refute and advance it. For a recent attempt at refutation — arguing that the New 
Testament was Platonic from the outset — see Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, Origen, Patristic 
Philosophy, and Christian Platonism: Re-Thinking the Christianisation of Hellenism, 
in: Vigiliae Christianae, 63 (2009), 217-63. And for a modern version of the kind of 
account advanced by Thomasius — treating the admission of Platonism as driven by 
local competition between Christian and Platonic theologians — see Heinrich Dörrie, 
Die andere Theologie, in: Theologie und Philosophie, 56 (1981), 217-63. A helpful 
discussion of the issues can be found in Winrich Löhr, Christianity as Philosophy: 
Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual Project, in: Vigiliae Christianae, 
64 (2010), 160-88. Löhr resists attributing essential forms to either Christianity or 
philosophy, focusing instead on the model provided by the Greek philosophical 
schools — as small groups of young nobles learning the arts of spiritual 
transformation under a holy master — during the early Christian period. Christian 
philosophy of the kind taught by Origen was rooted in this ‘psychagogical’ model of 
the school, and it was in this context that the Platonic conception of God entered 
Christian teachings as part of a paedeia for an elite.  
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in mutual heretication and excommunication. The history of the Catholic church thus 
must be understood in terms of the political victory of a particular ecclesiastical 
faction. The capacity of a philosophical religion to claim privileged clerical access to 
saving truth also permitted the elevation of bishops over secular princes. Princes thus 
could be stationed with the laity, making them vulnerable to the weapons of 
excommunication and heretication developed through the philosophical credalisation 
of faith, thereby turning princes into the secular branch of the church (9, §40-44). It is 
on the basis of these two fundamental historical premises — the philosophical 
transformation of Christianity into rival speculative creeds during the patristic period, 
and the use of such creeds to secure the dominance of a particular church faction in 
the post-Constantinian period — that Thomasius approaches the ecclesiastical history 
of the New Testament. 
The broad manner in which Thomasius operates with these twin premises is clear 
enough in his discussion of the ecclesiastical history of the first century. Here he 
wants to show that as a result of the church’s need to find apostolic precedents for 
modern rituals and institutions — confirmation, priestly ordination, celibacy, the 
Sabbath, holy days, creeds, excommunication, even the apostolic succession itself — 
a dense thicket of apocryphal, allegorical, spurious, fabulous, and downright 
fraudulent texts had sprung up around Christ’s original teachings, obscuring and 
defacing them. William Cave’s lives of the apostles — where we read that John 
performed such miracles as converting a murderer, and preventing his followers from 
coming to harm through bathing with a heretic — is a typical case of the recycling of 
patristic fables for modern purposes (10, §5). So too is the use of false gospels — 
Barnabas, the pseudo Acts of the Apostles, the Sibylline Oracles — as the source of 
such stories about the holy family as that Mary did not die, that her own conception 
had been virginal, that her uterus had not opened during Christ’s birth, and that she 
did not commence conjugal relations with Joseph after the birth (10, §§6-9). In 
crediting Basnage with exposing these fables, Thomasius conjectures that they arose 
as part of the post-apostolic institution of priestly celibacy in the Catholic church (10, 
§9, note x). 
Once again, Thomasius’s discussion is wholly dependent on recent secondary 
sources. He relies on Richard Simon’s biblical criticism for the separation of the 
canonical from the apocryphal and suppositious books of the New Testament, and on 
the ecclesiastical histories of Arnold, du Pin, and (the émigré Huguenot) Basnage de 
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Beauval, for the historicisation of patristic writers. In the case of the church fathers 
Thomasius tells his students that one must take a balanced approach. They must be 
given due esteem, but nonetheless approached as fallible humans whose opinions 
differed depending on time and place; whose imaginings were sometimes overcome 
by fables about the apostles; who had insufficient knowledge of history, chronology 
and the Hebrew language; and who inadvertently corrupted Christian theology 
through their incorporation of Greek philosophy (10, §26). 
Since the fathers were only men without divine gifts, to conceal their errors 
would be incompatible with the offices of the good man and the good historian (10, 
§27). This makes it outrageous of Cave to attribute impiety to those who expose such 
errors, as if piety were a condition of erudition. Yet this is in keeping with the fact 
that Cave’s lives of the martyrs and fathers belongs to the genre of panegyrics not 
history, as Basnage and Le Clerc have shown in exposing his inventions (10, §§28-
29). This same misguided and anti-historical linkage of erudition to piety has 
permitted the survival of various fabulous and suppositious works — the apocryphal 
Letter of Barnaby, the pseudo-apostolic Shepherd of Hermas (Pastor Hermae), and 
the Clementine romances (including the story of St Peter’s deathbed installation of 
Clement as his successor in the See of Rome) — when they should have been 
declared inauthentic on the basis of their admixture of spurious and non-Christian 
materials (10, §§31-35). Moreover, it is not just the Catholics like Du Pin who have 
sought to preserve this false literature for their apologetic purposes, so too have 
various Protestants, including Arnold (of all people!). Driven by his love of mystical 
theology, Arnold has thus insisted on accepting Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite as 
an apostolic writer, even though historical scholarship has shown that his (heavily 
neo-Platonic) writings date from the fourth century and that he thus could not 
possibly have been converted by St Paul as tradition claimed (10, §37). 
In discussing the emergence of a philosophical-creedal religion during the 
second century, Thomasius grounds his account in recent studies of the patristic 
reception of Greek philosophy within Christianity, including his own father’s 
Schediasma Historicum. Here he attempts to provide a balanced characterisation of 
the second-century church as the relevant context of reception. On the one hand, the 
church had not yet appeared in its hierarchical and orthodox form: there were as yet 
no official creeds or confessions, no councils to declare them, no excommunication or 
heresy laws to enforce them, and while philosophy was used to explicate scripture, 
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various factions used various philosophies (11, §§8-12, 21-22). On the other hand, 
though, despite Dodwell’s treatment of them as quasi-divine, the fact that many of the 
fathers had been Platonic philosophers — including Ignatius, Polycarp, Tertullian, 
Irenaeus, Clement, and Origen — indicates that this was the period in which Greek 
philosophy was introduced into Christianity, sowing the seeds of doctrinal orthodoxy 
and heresy (11, §§13-14). In sketching this development, Thomasius offers an 
account that is methodologically consistent with much modern scholarship, since his 
central strategy is to situate rival incipient Christian theologies in the space of profane 
history, by treating all of them as emerging from the reception of pagan philosophies 
into the teachings of rival church factions.36 
In discussing the manner in which the Valentinian and Montantist gnostics were 
hereticated by the leading patristic heresiologists — Irenaeus, Tertullian, Clement of 
Alexandria — Thomasius thus asks the mordant question: how could this heretication 
have been so successful when the fathers themselves seemed to hold many gnostic 
beliefs, and specifically the core doctrine that man could be saved through a purifying 
knowledge (gnosis) of the divine mysteries or essence? His answer is again 
methodologically continuous with modern ecclesiastical history, even if it has been 
superseded in the details. Thomasius’s basic stance is that the fathers attributed 
various heretical teachings to the gnostics as part of a local factional battle to 
determine true doctrine (11, §§21-26). In light of this, he prescribes two reciprocal 
hermeneutic protocols to his students. First, one should not believe all of the heretical 
doctrines that the fathers attach to the gnostics, as one needs to consider the degree to 
which these doctrines in fact arose from the hereticating interests of the fathers, and 
also whether the gnostics sometimes simply made honest mistakes. At the same time, 
one should not treat the gnostic doctrines as true or worthy of imitation, which is the 
mistake of today’s mystical theologians and cabbalists (11, §29). Thomasius then 
comments that while the hereticating of the Valentinian gnostics in the second 
century arose in part from their own factional separation from the church and in part 
from the patristic attack on them for the adoption of Jewish doctrines and pagan 
philosophy, later on this was fueled by a hatred of the Jews embedded in an emerging 
                                                
36  For a compact example of a modern account that displays this methodological 
consistency — while differing of course in its empirical contents — see the outline of 
jostling orthodoxies in the early church in Peter Brown, The Rise of Western 
Christendom: Triumph and Diversity, AD 200-1000, Oxford 1996, 34-53. See also, 
Löhr, Christianity as Philosophy (wie anm. 00). 
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Christian orthodoxy. In the following centuries, this hatred was installed in the 
dominant religion and used to cement the heretication of the gnostics, while the (no 
less pagan) Platonic and Stoic doctrines of the fathers were accepted as part of the 
Christian tradition (11, §33). 
In concluding this discussion, Thomasius poses a number of historical questions 
regarding the gnostics which again have their echoes in modern scholarship (11, §39). 
Was gnostic a name for various heretics or of a particular sect? Did they lead 
shameful lives or were they subject to pagan and orthodox calumnies? From whence 
did they arise, through adoption of the false teachings of the pagans or the Jews? 
Were they self-nominated or named by their enemies?37 Relying on Basnage as well 
as the extensive discussion of the gnostics in his father’s Schediasma historicum of 
1665, Thomasius inclines to the view that they were followers of Jewish and 
cabbalistic teaching who were stigmatised by Irenaeus and Clement in defence of a 
competing philosophical theology, then becoming hate-objects for the dominant 
Christian faction who endorsed rival Platonic and Stoic doctrines (11, §40).38 This 
helped sow the seeds for the hierarchical and political church that was in the process 
of forming. 
If the historicisation of speculative theologies means that they are to be 
understood contextually in terms the play of church factions, then this also means that 
the church itself exists in a purely profane historical time; since the historicisation of 
its central truths divorces it from the simple revealed truths of Christ and the apostles, 
rendering all claims to a sacred apostolic continuity anachronistic or fraudulent. 
Drawing on Arnold’s Brief Church History, Le Clerc’s Bibliotek Universale, and 
Basnage’s Annales ecclesiasti [?], Thomasius thus offers an historical outline of the 
‘universality’ of the church in terms of the triumph of a particular ecclesial faction, 
whose rituals, liturgies, and laws have been retrospectively imposed on the apostolic 
                                                
37  The continuing currency of these questions can be seen in Michael Allen 
Williams, Rethinking 'Gnosticism': An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Category, 
Princeton NJ 1996, which argues that gnosticism was largely a construction of the 
hereseologists. The contrary view — that there was a ‘gnostic religion’ grounded in 
the notion of salvation through knowledge and interacting with various forms of 
Christianity between the second and fifth centuries CE — can be found in Birger A. 
Pearson, Gnosticism and Christianity in Roman and Coptic Egypt, New York 2004.  
38  For the (considerable) extent to which this view remains current in modern 
scholarship, see David Brakke, Self-Differentiation among Christian Groups: The 
Gnostics and their Opponents, in: The Cambridge History of Christianity Volume 1: 
Origins, hg. v. Margaret M Mitchell u. Frances M Young, Cambridge 2006, 245-60.  
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church as a means of wielding apostolic authority against dissenters. Once again we 
encounter the co-existence of a particular religious viewpoint — a pietistic 
repudiation of all churches claiming apostolic authority, whether Catholic, Anglican, 
or Lutheran — accompanied by a mobilisation of a sophisticated historical 
scholarship. 
In discussing the third-century preconditions for the later emergence of a 
‘universal’ orthodox church, Thomasius offers a persuasive characterisation based 
largely on Basnage. To understand the works and doctrines of the third-century 
fathers and bishops, he argues, we must place them in the context of a church that 
consisted of a series of interlinked bishop-led communities. There was as yet no 
unifying Christian theology or ecclesiology, only various different emergent doctrines 
and rituals, each tied to local episcopal churches or factions (12, §3). Current disputes 
over the claimed apostolic origins of various rituals and doctrines can be resolved 
through the development of an ‘impartial’ discussion of their advancement by 
particular bishops or fathers in the context of these factional rivalries; although there 
may be cases — Thomasius mentions the dispute over the alleged apostolic origins of 
infant baptism — where the available evidence is not decisive, in which case his 
students must suspend judgment. 
Thomasius draws his central instances of these developments from Le Clerc’s 
life of Cyprian (bishop of Carthage), which he commends to his students as a model 
for patristic biography (12, §6), and for which he supplies an extensive paraphrase in 
a note added to the Latin edition of 1723 (12, §6, note 6). Given the array of issues 
sceptically canvassed in Le Clerc’s vita — Cyprian’s chastity as model for priestly 
celibacy, his visions as a source of prophetic knowledge, his martyrdom as proof of 
his holiness — it is striking that Thomasius restricts his attentions to a single core 
development: namely, the manner in which, under conditions of persecution, the 
third-century bishops acquired a capacity for supreme authority, which they exercised 
through the instrument of excommunication against all who opposed them (12, §7). In 
Le Clerc’s account, Cyprian was able to declare that disobedience to the bishop was 
the basis of all heresies, giving the bishops a despotic power within their 
communities. This provided the model for papal power and the basis of canon law, 
but that also paved the way for an exercise of clerical rule that would deprive the 
secular prince of his right in religious affairs (12, §10). 
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It is in this light that Thomasius asks his students to approach the many heresies 
and schisms of this period — including the controversy over adult baptism — as 
instances of the exercise of episcopal power by rival bishops in pursuit of a supreme 
authority over the church, hence as matters for description rather than adherence (12, 
§11). In the controversy over bishop Novation, for example — who founded a church 
to contest bishop Cornelius’s claim to the See of Rome — Thomasius warns his 
students that they should not accept the views of Novation’s opponents that his 
refusal to admit lapsed Christians into his church made him a heretic. At the same 
time, they should keep a sceptical distance from Novation’s excessive strictures 
against fallen Christians, keeping in mind’s Arnold’s exposure of these views as 
deriving from the asceticism of the Montanist sect (12, §12). In any case, it is clear 
that for Thomasius, Cornelius’s victory over Novation and his confirmation as bishop 
of Rome was not grounded in the truth of his theology or ecclesiology but in his 
capacity to convert religious authority into political domination. It was this capacity 
that underpinned the papacy and the history of canon law, leading to the exercise of 
religious authority in the civil domain and thereby infringing the rights of the civil 
sovereign. 
VII 
As Thomasius indicates in the preface, chapter 17 of the Cautelen — Cautelis circa 
doctrinam de jure summarum Potestatum circa Sacra / Von denen Cautelen bey der 
Lehre von dem Recht derer Fürsten in Kirchen-Sachen [Cautions regarding the 
doctrine of the rights of the sovereign power in religious affairs] — is the hinge on 
which the entire work pivots. It forms the link between the discussion of ecclesiastical 
history that occupies the first part of the work and the history of canon law that makes 
up the second, articulating the trio of preparatory studies for the jurisprudence of 
church law. It also constitutes the point of transition from the disciplines of 
ecclesiastical history and patristics where Thomasius was a mediator of recent 
secondary literature, to the disciplines of public law and political jurisprudence, to 
which he himself made major contributions. The pivot on which everything hinges is 
the distinction between sacerdotium and imperium, understood in terms of the 
difference between religious and secular government. This transition is marked by 
Thomasius’s systematic use of the Latin term saecularis and its German equivalent 
weltlich [‘wordly’, translated in modern English as ‘secular’], paired 
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contradistinctively with ecclesiasticus [belonging to the church] and geistlich 
[translated in modern English as ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ but also as ‘ecclesiastical’]. 
In order to understand this turn to the secular, however, we must take our own set 
of precautions. We must guard ourselves in particular against those modern 
ecclesiastical and intellectual historians who treat the turn to the secular as an epochal 
transition grounded in philosophical rationality and heralding a modernity associated 
with the enlightenment.39 As we shall now see, Thomasius’s construction of secular 
government was not grounded in a conception of philosophy pictured as the exponent 
of a universal reason, but in something else altogether: namely, in the disciplines of 
public law and political jurisprudence understood as exponents of sovereign rule over 
a territory. This domain-specific understanding of the secular is reflected in the 
synonyms that Thomasius chooses for weltlich (secular), namely, zivil and politisch. 
For Thomasius, it is not that law and politics are secular because they are 
grounded in a rational philosophy and its universal subject. Rather it is that law and 
politics constitute the secular as the domain formed by the exercise of a particular 
kind of rule: namely, the exercise of singular sovereign power for the sole purpose of 
ensuring civil peace, hence through the exclusion of all religious purposes and 
ecclesial institutions. Rather than being a general mentality or ‘social imaginary’ 
formed through philosophy or science, here the secular is identical to the civil or 
political understood as a form of rule (Herrschaft) from which religious authority has 
been expelled. Far from imagining that law and politics might be secularised on the 
basis of a (secular) rational or scientific mentality — this thought seems never to have 
crossed his mind — Thomasius conceived his task in terms of how to form the 
particular mentality or persona required for Christians to bear office in a secular civil 
state. That was the purpose for which the Cautelen had been written. 
For Thomasius, secular (which is to say civil or political) government is not 
grounded in rational philosophy — which remains tainted by gnosticism and 
sectarianism — but in history, specifically in the post-Reformation history in which 
                                                
39  This suppositious transition can be viewed positively as it is in Jonathan I. 
Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 
(Oxford, 2001), where Spinoza is credited with discovering the form of philosophical 
rationality that lies at the basis of a secular modernity. It can also be viewed 
negatively, as it is in Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA, 2007), where 
philosopical rationalism is treated in the Thomist manner as a post-Protestant 
uprooting of the transcendent bases of community. 
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princes have begun to reassert civil sovereignty against its ecclesial arrogation. This 
history is not a philosophical one in which a philosophical rationalism such as 
Spinozism or Deism is understood to have secularised church and state through the 
unfolding of individual reason, or else to have destroyed their properly transcendent 
grounds through the same unfolding.40 Rather it is a civil history contiguous with the 
ecclesiastical history that Thomasius has outlined in the first half of the Cautelen. In 
this history, Spinozism appears as an atheist sectarian metaphysics that recapitulates 
the philosophical corruption of faith; while the notion that church and state have 
transcendent grounds is one of the political arcana through which the papalists have 
arrogated civil sovereignty. In fact this is a history in which the secular emerges not 
from an unfolding philosophical or theological rationalism but as the contingent 
objective of a particular post-Reformation historical campaign: the battle to excise the 
church from the state apparatus, not just in order to retrieve the rights of civil 
sovereignty forfeited to the papalist church, but also to recover the simple purity of 
Christian faith from its philosophical credalisation and political utilisation. In short it 
is a history written for the Christian jurists and statesmen of a deconfessionalised 
Protestant territorial state. 
Thomasius thus tells his students that understanding of the prince’s rights in 
religious affairs must be grounded in a history of the conflict between ‘dem 
weltlichen and dem geistlichen Regiment’ [secular and religious government] and 
that the key to this can be found in the cautions for ecclesiastical history he has 
provided them with (17, §1). At the same time — despite recommending that they 
read Cocceius on public law, Heidegger’s history of the papacy, and Schilter’s De 
libertate ecclesiarum Germaniae — Thomasius declares that there is no suitable 
history of this conflict. This can be seen from the fact that the available histories date 
it from the investiture conflict of the eleventh and twelfth centuries whereas his own 
ecclesiastical history has already traced it back at least to the fifth century (17, §2). 
The place of the missing history has been taken by a widely held doctrine according 
to which secular and religious government can co-exist as a two-fold power within 
the state: the former responsible for governing the external church, the latter the 
internal; the former the prince’s domain, the latter belonging to the bishops or pope 
(17, §4). Despite being responsible for much civil tumult, this doctrine of the double 
                                                
40  The former view is advanced by Israel, the latter by Taylor (wie anm. 00). 
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power has persisted even after the Reformation, in part because it serves the political 
interests of the clergy, and in part because those who have opposed it in the name of 
the secular prince’s supreme power have themselves been hereticated, as followers of 
the ‘political heresy’ (17, §§8-10). 
In lieu of the missing modern history of the struggle between the defenders of 
secular and religious authority, Thomasius instead offers a sketch of recent writers 
who are themselves participants in this battle, providing a contemporary 
contextualisation that will also include his own writings. He thus begins with Erastus 
of Heidelberg whose defence of princely supremacy over the church led the Swiss 
Calvinists to anathematise an Erastian heresy (17, §11). Thomasius then turns to the 
defence of the prince’s rights by the Dutch Arminians at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, commenting that it was this defence against the clericalism of 
the counter-Remonstrants that provided the context for the writings by Uytenbogard, 
Grotius, Walaeus, and others that he cited in his first chapter (17, §12, note l). He then 
shifts his attention to the English civil war, treating it as a conflict between 
episcopalists and presbyterians for clerical control of the state, and providing the 
context for defences of ‘weltlichen Macht’ [secular power] by such groups as the 
Brownists and Independents. 
At this point Thomasius pauses to welcome a recent publication in the English 
context, The Rights of the Christian Church (1706) — Matthew Tindal’s authorship 
was unknown to Thomasius — noting that ‘der Auctor beweiset / daß eine zweifache 
Gewalt in einer Republique eine politische Contradiction in sich halte / und daß aus 
der independenz der geistlichen Gewalt nothwendig viele Unruhen in einer 
Republique enstehen mussen’ [the author proves that a two-fold power in a state 
contains a political contradiction, and that from the independence of religious power 
many disturbances must necessarily arise in a republic] (17, §13). Thomasius’s mode 
of reception of Tindal’s Rights — as a juridical defence of the supremacy of secular 
sovereignty supported by an extensive anti-apostolic ecclesiastical history — helps to 
confirm a recent revisionist scholarship which argues that this is indeed how Tindal’s 
work should be understood, rather than as an extension of Hobbesian or 
Harringtonian republicanism, or as the harbinger of a Deist philosophical 
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enlightenment.41 Small wonder then that Thomasius should suggest that the English 
author had drawn on Pufendorf, whose history of the papal monarchy and De habitu 
religionis christianae ad vitam civilem had first repudiated conceptions of a double 
power as tantamount to accepting the church as a state within the state, insisting 
instead that the church be understood as an association within a single unified state 
(17, §14).42 
With the transition to Pufendorf and the German context, Thomasius seeks to 
treat his own combative disputations and treatises as indicative of the unfinished post-
Reformation conflict over the supremacy of secular government in religious affairs. 
In a blow-by-blow iteration of events for which he had become celebrated (or 
notorious), and of works that his students would have known well, Thomasius recalls 
that he had begun lecturing on Pufendorf’s De habitu in 1692. This provided the 
context for (his star doctoral student) Enno Rudolf Brenneysen’s adiaphora 
dissertation of 1695, arguing for the prince’s right to regulate all ecclesial matters 
capable of provoking civil disturbance — liturgy, hymns, holy days, doctrinal 
controversies — apart from the individual’s personal relation to God.43 Brenneysen’s 
and Thomasius’s work provoked (the Saxon theologian) Johann Benedict Carpzov’s 
defence of the clergy’s exclusive right to decide ‘internal’ theological controversies 
under the doctrine of a dual religious and secular authority in the state.44 Thomasius 
records that he and Brenneysen then responded to Carpzov with a major treatise — 
Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten — dealing with the 
                                                
41  Dmitri Levitin, Matthew Tindal's Rights of the Christian Church (1706) and 
the Church-State Relationship, in: The Historical Journal, 54 (2011), 717-40.  
42  Pufendorf’s Historisch- und Politische Beschreibung der Geistlichen 
Monarchie des Stuhls zu Rom of 1679 had been translated into English as the The 
History of Popedom in 1691, followed by the De habitu in 1698, under the title Of the 
Nature and Qualification of Religion in Reference to Civil Society. Tindal cites from 
The History of Popedom on four occasions in the Rights, each time as an authority for 
the supremacy of the civil magistrate in the regulation of church affairs. 
43  Enno Rudolf Brenneysen and Christian Thomasius, De jure principis circa 
adiaphora (1695). In German, Vom Recht evangelischer Fürsten in Mitteldingen oder 
Kirchenzeremonien, in: Auserlesene deutsche Schriften, Erster Teil, Halle 1705, 
Hildesheim 1994, 76-209.  
44  Johann Benedict Carpzov, De jure decidendi controversias theologicas, 
Leipzig 1695.  
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rights of the prince to decide religious controversies in so far as they threatened social 
peace (17, §17).45 
A central theme of this treatise is that all legal rights are in fact derivatives of 
obligations, which in turn arise from the legislative commands of a sovereign issued 
for the secular end of maintaining civil peace. Christianity as such is not a source of 
legal right, since it is governed by relations of love and emulation that are by 
definition incapable of infringing civil peace hence becoming subject to sovereign 
command and obligation to which rights attach.46 In a point of striking difference 
from Tindal’s Lockean standpoint, this means that for Thomasius the right of 
toleration belongs not to individuals — on the basis of their rational pursuit of 
religious truth — but to the prince alone. He exercises it in the form of a political rule 
based on the sole end of maintaining civil peace, exclusive of all concern with 
religious truth, whose suspension is the condition of expelling the church from the 
state.47 The prince thus must tolerate all religions compatible with civil peace, not 
because they permit their members to seek religious truth, but because were the 
prince to attempt to impose a particular religion as true then he would be complicit 
with the clerical capture of the state and a return to papalism.  
The fact that for Thomasius toleration is the instrument and effect of the prince’s 
exercise of secular rule — rather than being an individual right grounded in the 
rational pursuit of religious truth — is a sign of how far Thomasius’s position differed 
from the Lockean dimension of Tindal’s, not to say from modern conceptions of 
‘liberalism’. In Thomasius’s construction, the secularity of the political domain is not 
grounded in a contractual theory arguing that individuals have refused to delegate 
their search for religious truth to the state. Rather it arises from the historical fact that 
a state has excluded the search for religious truth from the political domain as the 
condition of insulating politics and law from the incendiary energies of the rival 
confessions. Thomasius thus declares that while the prince should encourage a true 
piety in the republic, he should not imagine that virtue, love, and piety can fostered 
through criminal law rather than through teaching and example, nor that God could 
                                                
45  Christian Thomasius and Enno Rudolf Brenneysen, Das Recht evangelischer 
Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten, Halle 1696.  
46  Ebd., 171. 
47  Ebd., 167. 
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command anything that would disturb the peace and happiness of the republic in 
temporal affairs (17, §§34-38). 
Situated in this intellectual context, rather than being deduced from moral or 
philosophical principle, the prince’s right in religious affairs is a matter of prudential 
knowledge embedded in a political casuistry whose central instrument is in fact the 
assembling of ‘cautions’: Weil ich aber anderswo gelehret daß die Regeln der 
Klugheit am meisten in Cautelen bestehen … [For as I have taught elsewhere, the 
rules of prudence for the most part consist in cautions …] (17, §41). In summarising 
his cautions Thomasius advises the prince to be wary of those disturbing the peace in 
the name of honouring God as this is usually a mask for clerical tyranny (17, §42); 
that he should avoid persecuting erring Christians as long as they live peaceably (17, 
§§43-45); and that he should not seek civil peace through the imposition of 
confessional formulas, the excommunication of dissenters, through synods, councils, 
and colloquia, or through religious oaths (17, §§46-51). At the same time, as a 
condition of maintaining civil peace, dissenters must themselves be taught tolerance 
and be forbidden from persecuting each other, and should they prove recalcitrant then 
they can be compelled to emigrate (17, §§55-56). Here too though — as in the case of 
the abrogation of ‘superstitious’ religious ceremonies — the prince should proceed 
prudentially and casuistically, considering whether the exercise of his right might 
itself cause civil unrest, and thence restrain it accordingly (17, §§58-60). 
For Thomasius, then, rather than being an absolute Lockean philosophical right 
that rational religious individuals possess against an intolerant state, toleration is an 
historical right that states have acquired as a means of exercising secular rule over 
intolerant religious communities.48 This in turn is a pointer to the different historical 
contexts in which Tindal and Thomasius operated. If Tindal sought to steer 
parliamentary supremacy towards toleration by deploying a Lockean conception of 
rationally based religious freedom, that was in a vain attempt to prevent parliament 
from using the common law to enforce adherence to the Church of England as the 
condition of holding civil office.49 Thomasius’s defence of princely toleration 
                                                
48  Ian Hunter, The Tolerationist Programmes of Thomasius and Locke, in: 
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Stanton, Oxford 2013, 107-37.  
49  Mark Goldie, John Locke and Anglican Royalism, in: Political Studies, 31 
(1983), 61-85. See also, J. C. D. Clark, English Society 1660-1832: Religion, Ideology 
and Politics During the Ancien Regime. 2nd. edn, Cambridge 2000, 126-64.  
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however belonged to the very different historical context of Brandenburg-Prussia, 
where it provided a means by which a deconfessionalised Protestant state could 
exercise secular rule over a multi-confessional society.50 Thomasius himself implies 
as much in his comment on the success of Brandenburg’s ‘moderate’ religious 
policies in calming the theological conflicts of the preceding (seventeenth) century 
(17, §53, note w). 
VIII 
The central objective of the cautions attached to Thomasius’s third and final 
preparatory discipline — the history of canon law — is to destroy the view that canon 
law has a sacred authority arising from its continuity with the laws and institutions of 
the apostolic church. In relocating canon law within a profane history, Thomasius 
argues that its authority arose from two interrelated developments: firstly, from 
tendentious practices of textual compilation and authorisation serving the interests of 
factional clerical powers; and second, from the reception of these compilations as 
legal sources within particular jurisdictions, typically as the means by which the 
church annexed the secular authority of the civil sovereign. Underpinning both of 
these developments, however, is the more fundamental history that Thomasius has 
already outlined, describing how the church first emerged as an institution with the 
intent and capacity to exercise religious authority in the civil realm, in relation to 
which canon law was both effect and instrument. 
Thomasius thus prefaces his discussion of the history of canon law by 
recapitulating the main lessons of the Cautelen to this point. In summarising chapter 
17, he reminds his students that there can only be one highest power in a state. 
Consisting in the exclusive authority to legislate, appoint magistrates, and administer 
the law, this power is held by the civil or secular government and it extends to 
religious affairs, in relation to which the church cannot exercise an independent 
jurisdiction without dissolving civil sovereignty and destabilising the state (18, §§2-
3). Thomasius now wants to make this a matter of civil history, claiming that amongst 
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all peoples religious affairs have been administered by the king or his associates, and 
that where priests have assumed this role without deriving their authority from the 
‘civil’ or ‘secular’ power, then it is they who have exercised sovereignty (18, §4). 
Returning to his ecclesiastical history, Thomasius now insists that almost all 
religions have regarded the divinity as a mystery beyond human understanding and 
insusceptible of speculative knowledge. This is why the Greeks initially permitted the 
philosophers free reign in this regard, for nobody thought that their speculations 
regarding the divine essence had any effect on the edification of the will or the 
welfare of the republic (18, §§7-10). Not even the Jewish theocracy is allowed to 
stand in the way of this account for, initially at least, the Rabbis also denied that God 
could be an object of speculative understanding — Thomasius here citing 
Maimonides as his authority; and even later when they did formulate articles of faith 
these were not enforced through criminal statute (18, §14, note s). He then cites 
Selden as his authority for the claim that when the Jews did practice 
excommunication — during the time of the Babylonian Captivity — it was for civil 
infractions only, and not with a view to affecting the mind or will (18, §15). 
Once again though it is the advent of Christ — acceded to as a revealed truth — 
that constitutes the keystone of Thomasius’s ecclesiastical history and even supplies 
spiritual support for his construction of the secular character of civil power. In 
declaring that ‘sein Reich nicht von dieser Welt war’ ‘[his kingdom was not of this 
world’], Christ revealed that his dispensation had nothing to do with civil government 
— which remained undisturbed and could even be exercised legitimately by infidels 
— hence that he was not a law-giver but someone who taught saving truth without 
any exercise of political power (18, §16). Neither though did Christ seek to buttress 
his simple teachings with punishments, or to ground them in speculative knowledge 
from which articles of faith might be formulated, which meant that his disciples and 
apostles never attempted to prescribe doctrinal creeds or to legislate them as church 
law (18, §§18-19). Since Christ thus never attempted to establish a church in the 
confessional sense — as a body of believers held together through the legislative 
imposition of a doctrinal creed — the historical existence of such churches can only 
be understood as a corruption of Christ’s revelation, which holds they key to their 
historicisation. 
Recapitulating his earlier history Thomasius reminds his students that this 
corruption was driven by two mutually reinforcing developments: the use of Christ’s 
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teaching to contest civil government, and the introduction of esoteric doctrines from 
pagan philosophy and Jewish fables — he cites the gnostic doctrine of the aeons and 
the Jewish cabbala — from which competing creeds emerged and thence heresies and 
schisms (18, §20, note b). Adding a string of new authorities to his bow — 
Maastricht’s history of canon law, Conring’s and Becmann’s histories of the church 
councils — Thomasius then declares that it was from the confluence of these two 
developments that a hierarchical church emerged, at the top of which sat an 
episcopate claiming a sanctifying speculative knowledge of the divine essence. This 
knowledge could be formulated in creeds and enforced as laws, initially in battles 
between rival bishops but then, especially after the state recognition of the 
Christianity under Constantine, against emperors and kings (18, §§24-25). 
It was just at this point that canon law first appeared, in the form of the decrees 
of bishops that prescribed (so-called) ‘rules of life’ (canons) and ‘rules of belief’ 
(dogma) (18, §27). These could then be endorsed by church councils and enforced 
through civil punishments — as occurred with the heretication of Arianism at the 
Council of Nicaea (325 CE) — showing that the decretals in fact had the force of 
‘weltlich Gesetze’ (secular laws, legum politicarum in the Latin edition) (18, §28). 
Canon law must thus be historically understood as the instrument and effect of the 
transformation of Christianity into a creedal and political episcopal church during the 
first five centuries of its history. This understanding has been obscured through the 
neglect of historical study, and by the systematic attempt by churches to treat the 
apostolic Council of Jersualem (c. 50 CE) as the founding model for later church 
councils (18, §33). Displaying the link between the historical criticism of 
anachronism and the (anti-)confessional attack on apostolic churches, Thomasius 
argues that this pursuit of apostolic continuity ignores the fact that the Council of 
Jerusalem was not concerned with articles of faith or the secrets of the divine essence, 
but with the right conduct of life; and that it sought to resolve differences by 
assembling the whole community, not through the decrees of bishops enforced as law 
(18, §§34-39). 
Once canon law has been historicised in this manner, then its compilations lose 
the aura of sacred texts and assume the status of profane historical artefacts, imbuing 
their philological study with a new importance. Rather than being understood in terms 
of the unfolding of an original truth through continuous spiritually inspired iterations, 
the historical articulation of canon law is now understood quite differently: as the 
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compilation of episcopal decrees in codices and books in accordance with wholly 
profane purposes — typically the pursuit of factional ecclesial power — and the 
reception of these compilations as the instruments of particular jurisdictions. Drawing 
on Maastricht’s history in particular, Thomasius thus argues that there has never been 
a true or universal form of canon law, unfolding continuously under inspired spiritual 
guidance. There is only a discontinuous array of compilations, each assembled in 
accordance with particular factional purposes. 
This historicisation then permits him to use textual criticism to demonstrate that 
compilations purporting to show the continuity and universality of canon law could 
only do so by engaging in a variety of suspect practices with regard to their source 
texts. These practices included neglecting or falsifying the chronology of sources; 
ignoring differences in their contexts in order to establish continuity; inventing new 
sources to fill in any gaps; and sometimes fabricating new canons serving particular 
ecclesial interests, those of papal supremacism in particular (19, §§1-8). Compilations 
possessing authority derived this not from their textual fidelity to true and original 
sources, but from the fact that they were ‘authorised’ or rendered compulsory through 
the brute exercise of conciliar or papal power. This was the process that led to the 
incorporation of canon law in Roman law under the emperor Constantine. 
As a result of the official ecclesial belief in the continuous guiding presence of 
the Holy Spirit in all such undertakings, it is likely that these practices for 
retrospectively establishing the continuity and universality of canon law compilations 
seemed less suspect to contemporaries than they do to modern historians. This is 
comparable to the situation in which belief in a trans-historical ‘reason’ permits 
modern philosophical historians to relegate contextual differences between source 
texts in favour of an underlying intellectual continuity. It also compares with the way 
in which belief in a trans-historical ‘justice’ permits modern legal historians to adopt 
an anachronistic view of post facto changes to legal codes, by treating these as 
recovering a truth that was present latently from the beginning. In approaching the 
various compilations of canon law as wholly driven by the profane historical purposes 
of the compilers — thereby repudiating the view that contemporary changes could 
establish continuity with apostolic truth — historical-philological scholarship of the 
kind used by Thomasius was establishing new norms for textual criticism, even if the 
‘continuist’ practices of some modern philosophical, theological, and juridical 
historians indicate that these norms remain contested.  
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The two main instances of this kind of textual criticism of canon law in the 
Cautelen are those that Thomasius provides for the compilations of Dionysius 
Exiguus (Dennis the Humble) (c.470-c.544), and the ninth-century Pseudo-Isidore. 
According to Thomasius, under the pretext of providing a new Latin translation of the 
old Canonum ecclesiae universae, Dionysius in fact produced a new codex designed 
to prove the preeminence of the Roman church over other branches. Citing Maastricht 
and Meier as his authorities, Thomasius argues that Dionysius achieved his purpose 
by corrupting and falsifying the older codex, interpolating the spurious Apostolic 
Constitutions, falsifying the numbers and distinctions of earlier codices, and deleting 
canons unfavourable to the supremacy of the Roman pope. This meant that different 
codices would now be used by the Western and Eastern forms of the so-called 
universal church (19, §§9-11).51 
For all of its authority within the Roman church, however, the Dionysian codex 
was only one of many canon law collections that mushroomed from synods and 
councils across the Western and Eastern churches, in various forms, none of which 
could be endorsed by a ‘universal church’ at this time (19, §§14-17). The ninth-
century compilation attributed to the pseudonymous Isidore Mercator provides 
Thomasius with and example closer to a forgery. In purporting to the provide an 
ancient justification for the universal authority of the papacy — in fact as a means of 
allowing bishops to go over the heads their local metropolitan archbishops — the 
Isidorian compilation contained previously unknown episcopal letters and decretals. 
These were presented as if they had been written by Roman bishops between the first 
and fourth centuries, but were produced in the ninth century, almost certainly by a 
group of Frankish monks (19, §18). Perhaps alluding to the development of a Catholic 
historical school of canon law scholarship within Germany, Thomasius acknowledges 
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that some upright Catholics had long since seen through the Isidorian forgery — 
although its authenticity was maintained by others — but that it had first been first 
detected by the Magdeburg Centurians and then definitively exposed by the Calvinist 
humanist jurist David Blondel (19, §19).52  
Thomasius dedicates a whole chapter to the discussion of Gratian’s twelfth-
century compilation, as it remained in use in German universities and courts, and was 
used in the ‘making’ of doctors of law, even in Protestant territories. In comparison 
with the preceding examples, Thomasius’s account of Gratian is much more nuanced. 
On the one hand, in acknowledging the existence of conflicting canons and 
attempting to reconcile them — his collection was known as the Concordantia 
discordantium canonum (concordance of discordant canons) — Gratian acted in good 
scholarly faith and greatly improved the textual authenticity and coherence of canon 
law. On the other hand, though, because of the darkness of his times — reflected in 
his lack of access to good quality primary and secondary sources — Gratian’s 
reconciliatory interpretations and emendations were not conducted in accordance with 
the rules of ‘critical method’. This meant that some of the old forgeries slipped 
through, and the whole enterprise remained governed by the attempt to 
retrospectively establish the continuity and universal authority of canon law (20, §§3-
5). 
Nonetheless, the authority of this collection cannot simply be read off from its 
support of a particular ecclesial faction, since Gratian’s work was more even-handed 
than this. His compilation thus has been criticised by some Catholics for failing to 
unambiguously support papal supremacy, while praised by others for the same reason 
(20, §10). Many Protestant jurists and theologians who use the collection, however, 
remain blind to the form of authority that it does possess. This authority arises from 
the fact that from the twelfth century onwards the popes permitted Gratian’s 
collection to be taught in schools and universities, which continues to be the case 
even in Protestant territories (20, §11). Thomasius thus argues that Gratian’s authority 
arose not from papal decree or direct legal reception, but from ‘Gewohnheit und 
langen Gerbrauch’ [‘custom and long use’] in the universities. Here it formed judges 
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and lawyers, and thereby entered the courts where it gradually obtained the force of 
law (20, §12). This authority was buttressed by the agreement of the professors of 
theology, and also by the work of many academic glossators, whose glosses 
themselves could obtain the force of law with the transition from university to 
courtroom (20, §§13-14). From the middle of the thirteenth century there was an 
attempt to stabilise canon law in the form of a compilation based on Gratian, with 
pope Gregory IX banning the use of any other compilation in the schools, and also 
forbidding new compilations to be undertaken except at papal command (20, §16). 
Subsequent popes did indeed commission a few new collections, not least so that their 
own decrees could be added to Gratian’s compilation, frequently in order to lend legal 
weight to their battle with the emperors by annexing significant parts of the secular 
imperial jurisdiction (20, §§20-25). 
If the production of textual compilations in the interests of ecclesial power 
constitutes the first leg of Thomasius’s history of canon law, then the second leg is 
provided by an account of the reception of canon law in particular jurisdictions, 
typically as the result of cultural and political contestation. Thomasius prefaces this 
account with some remarks on a conflict over church governance between those 
supporting the ‘monarchical’ government of the papacy and those advancing 
‘aristocratic’ government by church councils. Among those who have supported the 
latter conciliarist position are German Catholics seeking a national church on the 
French anti-papal model. But a similar view has been advanced some Lutheran 
jurists, such as Benedict Carpzov, who have identified religious freedom with a 
national church governed by a clerical council or consistory (21, §§1-10). On 
Thomasius’s account, this debate entirely misses the point. This is partly because in 
Germany the alliance between emperor and pope means that there is little scope for 
national versions of Catholicism comparable with the French case where, 
concomitantly, canon law lacks the authority that it possesses in Germany. More 
importantly though it is because the central point is not whether the governance of the 
church is to be papal or conciliar, but whether the government of the state is to to be 
singular or dual — with power shared between secular and religious authorities as 
Carpzov envisages — in which case there is no sovereignty at all.  
To understand the reception of canon law in the German empire one must thus 
turn again to the conflict between ‘imperium et sacerdotium’, beginning with the 
centuries long struggle between German emperors and the papacy. Without 
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attempting to capture the detail of Thomasius’s account — which begins with the 
Merovigian empire then moves through the Carolingian and into the Holy Roman 
German Empire — we can simply note that it is focused in a series of contests 
between the emperors and popes over such matters as whether emperors had to be 
crowned by popes; whether emperors had the right to nominate bishops within 
imperial territories; whether the subjects of emperors and kings were under their 
exclusive jurisdiction or were also subject to the trans-territorial jurisdiction of the 
pope; and whether priests were under the secular jurisdiction of the prince (21, §§11-
21). In the course of these contests popes routinely used excommunication against 
emperors and their vassals, alongside more straightforwardly political and military 
measures. 
This protracted contest, Thomasius argues, provided the context for the 
compilation of papalist versions of canon law and their reception within the German 
empire. According to Thomasius, this reception took place even prior to the recovery 
of Justinian law during the twelfth century, in the form of the piecemeal reception of 
canon law in German courts during the later medieval period (21, §§36-40). During 
this time canon law was embedded in legal process and statutes, partially displacing 
German customary and feudal law, which Thomasius identifies with the moral 
customs of the German patria (21, §41). Even if canon law had to be formally 
received within the German imperial jurisdiction through acts of the emperor and 
high courts, its infiltration of German legal culture prior to the recovery of imperial 
Roman law left the emperors at a disadvantage when dealing with the power of the 
church (21, §42). The result was that during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
canon law had penetrated deep into the civil law jurisdiction, marginalising such 
customary laws as the Sachsen-Spiegel, and imposing religious jurisdiction in such 
areas as marriage, inheritance, oaths, contracts, wills, financial interest, and trial 
procedure (21, §§44-50). 
Thomasius’s account of the reception of canon law finds its bite, however, in the 
final two chapters of the Cautelen, in the course of his discussion of the post-
Reformation authority of canon law in the territories of Protestant princes. Here, 
drawing one Samuel Stryk’s De origine juris canonici () and Herman Conring’s De 
origine iuris Germanici (1643), Thomasius takes aim at Caspar Ziegler’s claims that 
canon law was no longer in force in Protestant Germany. According to Ziegler, canon 
law had been abrogated by Luther and subsequently uprooted from the common law 
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of imperial Germany, its passing being symbolised in Luther’s burning of canon law 
books at the University of Wittenberg in 1520 (22, §1). 
With regards to Ziegler’s claim that in civil law matters canon law has been 
displaced by imperial Justinian law, Thomasius reminds his students that in Protestant 
territories, when dealing with dubious cases, German law is valid only if the prior 
reception of canon law cannot be proved; but if it can be, then normally canon law 
has precedence over Roman law (22, §3). In discussing the fact that the assessors of 
the Reichskammergericht [Imperial Chamber Court] were charged with making their 
rulings under ‘the common law of Germany’, Thomasius takes issue with Ziegler’s 
claim that this is evidence of the prioritising of Roman law and perhaps even the 
abrogation of canon law altogether. Bringing his legal humanism to bear, Thomasius 
observes that by ‘the common law of Germany’, the emperors were referring not only 
to imperial public law but to all law customarily used in Germany. As Thomasius has 
shown, this embraces canon law too, which had been received in German schools and 
thence law courts prior to the recovery of Justinian law during the twelfth century (22, 
§§8-10). It is no less misguided though to claim that canon law has been abrogated in 
the consistorial church law of Protestant territories. Thomasius argues to the contrary 
that canon law remains in force in many Protestant consistories and cathedral 
chapters. This means that when Protestant jurists like Carpzov talk about church law 
they are actually referring to elements of canon law — in such areas as marriage, 
oath-taking and attestations, contracts, and even inquisitorial trial procedure — as 
opposed to the ecclesiastical ordinances of secular princes. 
Having brought his discussion of the history of canon law into the present, 
Thomasius can conclude the Cautelen with a pointed discussion of the ‘utility and 
neglect of the study of canon law in Protestant universities’. This amounts to a direct 
attempt to intervene in the curriculum and pedagogy of church law in Protestant law 
faculties. Thomasius’s central argument is that although canon law is indeed harmful 
to the state — as the instrument and effect of the exercise of religious power in the 
civil realm — it nonetheless remains deeply embedded in German legal culture and 
procedure, and hence must be a key part of Protestant legal education. In addressing 
this issue, Thomasius leaves his students with two final cautions. First, they must 
guard against claims that canon law no longer matters in Protestant territories, having 
been replaced by imperial civil (Roman) law. As Thomasius has just outlined, Roman 
law has not displaced canon law, which was earlier absorbed into German legal 
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culture and morals, and remains embedded in court procedures and customary law. 
Second, they must be wary of claims that it is appropriate to retain those parts of 
canon law dealing with the avoidance of sin, as a subsidiary law that complements 
civil law (23, §9). Here we are back on the terrain of the exercise of two forms of 
legal authority within a territory, which Thomasius has already shown amounts to the 
installation of the church as a state within the state, and disguises the fact this actually 
turns the secular prince’s civil law into a subsidiary of canon law. If anyone should 
doubt this, says Thomasius, then let them examine the consistorial jurisprudence of 
such writers as Carpzov, Voetius, Bruckner and others, especially with regards to 
their treatment of marriage as a religious sacrament. 
Students thus must be taught church law, Thomasius argues, but from the 
standpoint of the offices that they will occupy as officials and advisers in the 
governments of German states and princes. They must therefore be shown how to 
investigate the reception of canon law in Germany from the perspective of its 
agreement with the principles of public law and politics, permitting them to identify 
the presence of papalist remnants in church law, which has been the central purpose 
of the Cautelen itself (23, §§11-12). With regard to this continuing presence of canon 
law in German legal culture, Thomasius argues that while jurists are not permitted to 
abrogate the published laws of princes, they are allowed to alter ‘legal observances’, 
or the customs and culture of the law. But this is precisely the level at which canon 
law persists; so that what has been implanted through culture may be uprooted 
through culture, as can be seen in recent changes to marriage law and the prince’s 
right of reprieve (23, §13). For this to happen though it is not enough for teachers to 
assemble a reading-list for their students consisting of unassimilated canonists and 
civilians, authorities and decisions, terminologies and nomenclatures: ‘rather they 
must have an integrated knowledge of ethics, natural law, politics, and ecclesiastical 
history; and they must comprehend a sound and reasonable theology; that is, one that 
steers a path between scholastic orthodoxy and irrational enthusiasm’ [sondern sie 
müssen eine rechtschaffene Erkäntüß der Sitten Lehre / der natürlichen Rechte / der 
Politic und der Kirchen-Historie haben / und eine wahre and vernünftige Theologie, 
d. i. die das Mittel zwischen der Orthodoxen Scholastischen / und unvernünfftigen 
Enthusiastischen trifft / verstehen] (23, §14). That is how Thomasius understood the 
purpose of the Cautelen. 
